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1.  Introduction 
This  paper  uses  a  nonlinear  stochastic  model  to  describe  inflation- 
unemployment  dynamics  in the  United  States  after World War II. The 
model  is a vector autoregression  with  coefficients  that are random walks 
with  reflecting barriers that keep the VAR stable. The innovations  in the 
coefficients  are arbitrarily correlated with  each  other  and with  innova- 
tions  to  the  observables.  The model  enables  us  to  detect  features  that 
have  been  emphasized  in  theoretical  analyses  of  inflation-unemploy- 
ment  dynamics.  Those  analyses  involve  coefficient  drift  in  essential 
ways. 
Thus,  DeLong  (1997),  Taylor (1997,  1998),  and  Sargent  (1999) inter- 
preted  the broad movements  of the inflation  rate in terms of the mone- 
tary authority's  changing  views  about  the  Phillips  curve.  According  to 
them,  the  runup  in  inflation  in  the  late  1960s  and  1970s  occurred 
because  the  monetary  authority  believed  that there  was  an exploitable 
trade-off between  inflation  and  unemployment.  Its beliefs  induced  the 
monetary  authority  to  accept  the  temptation  to inflate  more  and  more 
until eventually  it had attained Kydland-Prescott  (1977) time-consistent 
inflation  rates.  But  the  observations  of  the  1970s  taught  Volcker and 
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Greenspan  the  natural-rate  hypothesis,  which  they  eventually  acted 
upon  to reduce  inflation. 
Another  mechanism  was  posited  by Parkin (1993) and Ireland (1999), 
who  argued  that the  inflation-unemployment  dynamics  are driven  by 
exogenous  drift in the natural rate of unemployment,  for example  due 
to demographic  changes.  Because  the time-consistent  inflation  rate var- 
ies  directly  with  the natural rate of unemployment,  Parkin and Ireland 
attributed  the  drift  in  the  inflation  rate  to  drift  in  the  natural  rate  of 
unemployment. 
The  DeLong-Taylor-Sargent  story  makes  contact  with  various  ele- 
ments  in  Lucas's  (1976) critique.  It makes  the  drift in  inflation-unem- 
ployment  dynamics  a consequence  of  the  monetary  authority's  evolv- 
ing  views  about  the  economy.  The  story  attributes  alterations  in  the 
law  of motion  for inflation  and unemployment  to the  changing  behav- 
ior of the monetary  authority, which  emerges  in turn from its changing 
beliefs.  This  story  is  consistent  with  one  way  that  Lucas  (1976)  has 
been  read,  namely,  as an invitation  to impute  observed  drift in coeffi- 
cients  of  econometric  models  to  time-series  variation  in  government 
policy  functions. 
Sargent's  (1999) version  of  the  story  focuses  on  how  the  coefficient 
drift over time affected the results  of time-series  tests of the natural-rate 
hypothesis.  In the late  1960s,  Robert Solow  and James Tobin proposed 
a test of the natural-rate hypothesis.  Using  data through  the late 1960s, 
that  test  rejected  the  natural-rate  hypothesis  in  favor  of  a permanent 
trade-off  between  inflation  and  unemployment.  Lucas  (1972) and  Sar- 
gent (1971) criticized that test for not properly  stating the implications  of 
the  natural-rate  hypothesis  under  rational  expectations.  In  particular, 
the Solow-Tobin  test was  correct only  if inflation  exhibited  a unit root. 
Before the  1970s, postwar  U.S.  inflation  data did not exhibit a unit root, 
rendering  invalid  (in  the  opinion  of  Lucas  and  Sargent)  Solow's  and 
Tobin's interpretation  of  their  test.  However,  in  the  1970s,  just  when 
U.S.  inflation  seems  to have  acquired  a unit root,  the Solow-Tobin  test 
began  accepting  the  natural-rate  hypothesis.  Building  on  Sims  (1988) 
and  Chung  (1990), Sargent  (1999) constructs  an adaptive  model  of the 
government's  learning  and policymaking  that centers  on the process  by 
which  the  government  learns  an imperfect  version  of  the  natural-rate 
hypothesis,  cast in terms of Solow  and Tobin's representation. 
Parts of Sargent's  adaptive  story  acquire credibility  when  it is noted 
how  the Solow-Tobin  characterization of the natural-rate hypothesis  has 
endured,  despite  the criticism of Lucas and Sargent.  As Hall (1999) and 
Taylor (1998) lament,  that faulty characterization continues  to be widely 
used.  For example,  see  Rudebusch  and  Svensson  (1999) for a widely Evolving  Post-World  War  II U.S. Inflation  Dynamics  *  333 
cited  model  that  represents  the  natural-rate  hypothesis  in  the  Solow- 
Tobin form. Fisher and Seater (1993), King and Watson (1994, 1997), Fair 
(1996), Eisner  (1997), and  Ahmed  and  Rogers  (1998) construct  tests  of 
long-run  neutrality  that are predicated  on the assumption  of a unit root 
in inflation.1 Estrella and Mishkin  (1999) use the Solow-Tobin  character- 
ization  to estimate  the natural rate of unemployment.  In the discussion 
following  the  paper  by  Estrella and  Mishkin,  John Williams  confesses 
that  the  Federal  Reserve  Board's  large-scale  macroeconometric  model 
also incorporates  this characterization. Hall questions  its validity for U.S. 
data after 1979 and sharply criticizes its continued  use. 
Taylor (1998) warns that adherence  to the erroneous  econometric  char- 
acterization of the natural-rate hypothesis  will eventually  cause policy to 
go  astray. Because  of  the  diminished  serial  correlation  that he  sees  in 
recent inflation data, Taylor is concerned  that the disappearance  of a unit 
root in inflation means  that the faulty test may soon  signal an exploitable 
trade-off that will once  again tempt  the monetary  authority. The theme 
of both  Hall  and  Taylor is that failure to remember  the  theoretical  and 
econometric  lessons  of the 1970s is likely to resuscitate pressure to inflate 
emanating  from the  empirical  Phillips  curve.  In the  same  symposium, 
Friedman (1998) and Solow  (1998) made a number of assertions  that may 
have  contributed  to  Taylor's worries.  Friedman  asserted  that  the  real 
effects  of monetary  policy  are so long-lasting  that "for all practical pur- 
poses  they  might  just  as well  be  permanent."  Solow  (1998) expressed 
skepticism  about  the  natural-rate  hypothesis  and  suggested  that  the 
supporting  evidence  is specific  to the U.S.  economy  since  1970. He  ar- 
gued  that monetary  policy  can affect the natural rate of unemployment 
and  that the  experience  of the United  States in the  1960s suggests  that 
persistent  high  unemployment  would  yield  to  a  revival  of  aggregate 
demand.  Taylor's concern is that low inflation  would  be hard to sustain 
if belief in a long-run  trade-off were  again to become  influential. 
The object of this paper  is to develop  empirical evidence  that is rele- 
vant  to this  discussion.2  Section  2 describes  a Bayesian  model  that we 
use  to summarize  the evolution  of inflation  dynamics.  Section 3 reports 
1. Many of these authors pretest for a unit root and apply the Solow-Tobin  test only if they 
fail to reject the null hypothesis.  But pretesting  could  result in a more subtle version  of 
the  Lucas-Sargent  trap. Unit-root  tests have  low  power  and may fail to detect  circum- 
stances  in which  the Solow-Tobin  test is inappropriate. 
2. Albanesi,  Chari, and Christiano  (2000) model  the inception  and termination  of inflation 
in the 1970s with a sunspot  variable that shifts expectations  between  two regimes.  Their 
equilibrium excludes  the concerns about model  misspecification  that are the focus of the 
present  discussion.  It is possible  that a regime-switching  model  like theirs can confront 
the observations  about comovements  between  inflation  persistence  and mean  inflation 
that we  document  below. 334 *  COGLEY  & SARGENT 
stylized  facts about this evolution,  and Section 4 discusses  test statistics 
for the  Solow-Tobin  version  of  the  natural-rate  hypothesis.  Section  5 
considers Taylor's warning about recidivism  on the natural-rate hypothe- 
sis.  The paper concludes  with  a summary. 
2. A RANDOM-COEFFICIENTS  REPRESENTATION 
We use  a Bayesian  vector  autoregression  with  time-varying  parameters 
to  describe  the  evolution  of  the  law  of  motion  for  inflation.  We  are 
interested  in a random-coefficients  representation  for some  of the  rea- 
sons expressed  in the initial sections  of Lucas (1976). The Bayesian frame- 
work  treats  coefficients  as  random  variables,  making  it  attractive  for 
modeling  data  from  economies  in  which  important  decision  makers, 
including  the monetary  authority, are learning.3 
2.1. NOTATION  AND STATE-SPACE  REPRESENTATION 
The model has a nonlinear  state-space  representation.  The measurement 
equation  is 
Yt  =  XtOt  +  st,  (2.1) 
where  Yt  is an N  x  1 vector of endogenous  variables,  Ot  is a K x  1 vector 
of coefficients,  X[ is an N x  K matrix of predetermined  and/or exogenous 
variables,  and  Et  is an N  x  1 vector  of prediction  errors.  The vector  Yt 
includes  inflation  and  variables  useful  for predicting  inflation.  In this 
paper,  we  use  (2.1)  to  represent  a vector  autoregression,  so  that  the 
right-hand  variables  are  lags  of  Yt.  In  an  unrestricted  vector 
autoregression,  each  equation  contains  the  same  right-hand  variables, 
Xt  =  (IN?  X  )- 
We treat the coefficients  of the VAR as a hidden  state vector. The state 
vector  Ot  evolves  according  to 
p(Oe+ljOt,  V) oc  I(t+1)f(Ot+110t,  V),  (2.2) 
where  I(60) =  0 if the roots of the associated  VAR polynomial  are inside 
the unit circle and  1 otherwise;  V is a covariance  matrix defined  below; 
and 
f(Ot+1 Ot, V)  -  N(t,,  Q).  (2.3) 
3. Our  focus  in  this  paper  is  on  the  evolution  of  reduced-form  relationships.  Structural 
models  involve  nonlinear  cross-equation  restrictions  on  the  evolving  parameters,  and 
they  require nonlinear  filtering  methods.  We are currently  studying  nonlinear  filters. Evolving  Post-World  War  II U.S. Inflation  Dynamics  *  335 
Thus, f(0+lOt  , V) can be represented  as the driftless  random walk 
t =  Ot,-  +  Vt,  (2.4) 
where  vt  is an i.i.d.  Gaussian process with mean 0 and covariance  Q. The 
economy  changes  over  time  when  news  arrives,  making  Ot  vary in an 
unpredictable  way. Throughout  this paper, we  use f()  to denote  a nor- 
mal density,  and p (.) to denote  a more general density. 
We assume  that the innovations,  (e  , v[ )', are identically and indepen- 
dently  distributed  normal random variables with  mean zero and covari- 
ance matrix 
Et[t1][  v  ]=V=(R  C') 
(2.5) 
where  R is the N x N covariance matrix for measurement  innovations,  Q 
is the  K x  K covariance  matrix for state innovations,  and  C is a K x  N 
cross-covariance  matrix.  Following  the  Bayesian  literature,  we  call the 
O's  parameters  and the elements  of R, Q, and C hyperparameters. 
We assume  that the hyperparameters  and initial state  00  are indepen- 
dent,  that the initial state is a truncated  Gaussian  random  variable, and 
that  the  hyperparameters  come  from  an  inverse-Wishart  distribution. 
We adopted  these  parts of the prior mostly because  of their convenience 
in being  natural conjugates  for our Gaussian  virtual priorf. 
Letf(00)  = N(0,  P) represent  a normal prior with mean  0 and variance 
P. The prior for the initial state is 
p(0o) oc  I()N(0,  P).  (2.6) 
Our prior for the hyperparameters  is 
p(V)  =  IW(V-1,  To),  (2.7) 
where  IW(S, df)  represents  the  inverse-Wishart  distribution  with  scale 
matrix S and degrees  of freedom  df. This is a convenient  form because  it 
yields  an  inverse-Wishart  posterior  when  combined  with  a Gaussian 
likelihood.  Collecting  the  pieces,  the joint  prior for 00, V can be repre- 
sented  as 
p(0o V) oc I(0)N(0,  P) IW (V-1, To).  (2.8) 336 *  COGLEY  & SARGENT 
Both pieces  are informative,  but in the empirical section  we  set  0, P, V, 
and To  so that they are only weakly  informative. 
We use  the  following  notation  to denote  partial histories  of the vari- 
ables Yt and  Ot.  The vectors 
T =  [y  .  . 
yT],  (2.9) 
and 
T =  [0  ,.,  O]'T  (2.10) 
represent  the history  of data and states up to date T, and 
yT+1,TH  [y'T+,  y  T+H]  (2.11) 
and 
OT+1,T+H  =  [0'T+1,  .  .  .  I  'T+H]  (2.12) 
represent  potential  future trajectories from date T onward. 
We can use  (2.2) to assemble  the joint density 
p(OT  V) ac I(OT)f  (OTV),  (2.13) 
where 
T-1 




I(OT)  =  H I(O).  (2.15) 
t=O 
We call f  our virtual prior, and p the prior. The virtual prior f  makes  0 a 
driftless  random  walk.  Multiplying f(OTIV)  by I(gT)  puts  zero probability 
on sample paths of {Ot}  for which  Ot  for any t -0  corresponds  to unstable 
VAR coefficients.4 
4. An appendix  shows  that the model  formed by (2.3), (2.13), (2.14), and (2.15) implies  the 
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In (2.2),  the  truncation  of f(OtlOt_l,  V) through  multiplication  by  I(0t) 
reflects  our  opinion  that  explosive  representations  are implausible  for 
the  United  States.  An  unrestricted  normal  density  f(o|rV)  = f(00) HIT= 
f(Ot+110t,  V) for the  history  of states  0T implies  a positive  probability  of 
explosive  autoregressive  roots,  but  an explosive  representation  implies 
an infinite  variance  for inflation,  which  cannot  be optimal  for a central 
bank that minimizes  a loss  function  involving  the variance of inflation.5 
We restrict the prior to put zero probability on explosive  states. 
This representation  resembles  some of the models  in Doan,  Litterman, 
and  Sims  (1984), but  with  a different  prior. Doan  et al. were  primarily 
interested  in  forecasting  and  recommended  a  "random  walk  in  vari- 
ables" prior for the sake of parsimony.  We are less interested  in forecast- 
ing  and more interested  in summarizing  the data in a relatively  uncon- 
strained fashion,  so we  chose  the prior described  above. 
2.2 A LIMITATION  OF OUR MODEL: 
NO STOCHASTIC  VOLATILITY 
For macroeconomic  variables and a period similar to ours, Bernanke and 
Mihov  (1998a, 1998b) and Sims  (1999) presented  evidence  that favors a 
vector autoregression  with time-invariant  autoregressive  coefficients but 
a covariance matrix of innovations  that fluctuates  over time. In contrast, 
our  specification  allows  the  coefficients  to  vary  and  assumes  a time- 
invariant but unknown  innovation  covariance matrix V. While our prior 
fixes  V, our statistical methods  nevertheless  allow  the data to speak  up 
for volatility  or drift in  V, albeit in a restricted  and  adaptive  way.  Our 
estimates  of V conditioned  on time t data fluctuate over time in ways that 
we  shall discuss. 
We chose our specification  partly because we want to focus attention on 
the coefficient-drift  issues  raised by Lucas (1976). Our model  is rigged to 
let  us  detect  drifts  in  the  systematic  parts  of  government  and  private 
behavior  rules that show  up in the systematic  parts of vector autoregres- 
sions.  Our prior embodies  a prejudice that monetary policy changed  sys- 
tematically during the years that we study. In contradistinction,  the inter- 
pretation of the evidence  favored by Bernanke and Mihov  (1998a, 1998b) 
and Sims (1999) is consistent with a view that while distributions  of shocks 
have  evolved,  agents'  responses  to them have been  stable.6 
5. Alternatively,  explosive  representations  cannot  result  if the  monetary  policy  rule  en- 
sures  that inflation  is bounded.  We do not  claim that an integrated  representation  for 
inflation  is  implausible  on  statistical  grounds,  only  that  drift  in  inflation  is  hard  to 
reconcile with purposeful  central-bank behavior. 
6. See  Sims  (1982) and  Sargent  (1983) for theoretical  settings  that,  by  assuming  that the 
historical sample  was produced  by optimizing  government  behavior  and stable private- 
sector responses  to it, can explain such  a pattern. 338 *  COGLEY  & SARGENT 
2.3 POSTERIOR  PREDICTIVE  DENSITY 
As  Bayesians,  our  goal  is  to  summarize  the  posterior  density  for the 
objects  of interest.  We are mostly  interested  in a forward-looking  per- 
spective  in inflation,  so we want posterior  predictive  densities. 
In this model,  there are four sources  of uncertainty  about the future. 
The terminal state  0T  and the hyperparameters  V are unknown  and must 
be estimated.  In addition,  as time goes forward, the state vector will drift 
away  from  OT, and  the  measurement  equation  will  be  hit  by  random 
shocks.  Conditional  on  prior beliefs  and  data  through  date  T, beliefs 
about the future can be expressed  by the joint posterior  distribution, 
p(yT+l,T+H,  0T+1,T+H 
0,  V  YT).  (2.16) 
Our objective is to characterize (2.16). This is a complicated  object, but 
it  can  be  decomposed  into  more  tractable  components.  We begin  by 
factoring (2.16) into the product  of a conditional  and a marginal density, 
p(yT+l,T+H, 
0T+1,T+H  0T  V  ]yT) 
=  p(T,  V  |  yT)  p(yT+1,T+H,  0T+1,T+H I  0,  V,  YT).  (2.17) 
This expression  splits  the joint density  into  a factor that represents  be- 
liefs about the past and present and another that represents beliefs  about 
the  future.  The first factor is the joint posterior  density  for hyperpara- 
meters and the history of states.  It summarizes  current knowledge  about 
system  dynamics,  based  on  data  and  prior beliefs.  The  second  factor 
reflects  the  uncertainty  about  the  future  that would  be present  even  if 
the current state and hyperparameters  were  known  with  certainty. This 
factor reflects  the influence  of future  innovations  to the  state and mea- 
surement  questions. 
Analytical  expressions  for each piece  are unavailable,  even  for simple 
cases.  Instead,  we  use  Monte  Carlo  methods  to  simulate  them.  The 
algorithm  is  split  into  two  parts,  corresponding  to  the  components  of 
(2.17). The first part uses  the Gibbs sampler to simulate  a draw of T0 and 
V from  the  marginal  density,  p(07, V IYT).  The  second  step  plugs  that 
draw into the conditional  density  p(yT+l,T+H,  oT+1,T+H  0T,  V,  yT)  and gener- 
ates a trajectory for future data and states. 
2.4  BELIEFS  ABOUT THE PAST AND  PRESENT 
The posterior density  for states and hyperparameters  can be expressed  as Evolving  Post-World  War  II U.S. Inflation  Dynamics ?  339 
p(OT VI  Y)  ac  p(YT I|  o,  V)p(O,  V), 
of (YT I  o,  V)p(OTIV)p(V), 
oc I(0T) [f(yT  lOT, V)f (oTV)p(V)].  (2.18) 
The first line  follows  from Bayes's  theorem:  p(OT, V) represents  a joint 
prior for hyperparameters  and  states  and  p(YT  I OT,  V) is a conditional 
likelihood.  Conditional  on  states  and  hyperparameters,  the  measure- 
ment  equation  is  linear  in  observables  and  has  normal  innovations. 
Thus, the conditional  likelihood  is Gaussian,  p(YT T0, V) =f(YT  I  OT, V), as 
shown  in the second  line. The joint prior for hyperparameters  and states 
can be factored into a marginal prior for V and a conditional  prior for 0T, 
and  substituting  I(T)  f(OTIV) for p(OTIV)  delivers  the  expression  on  the 
third line. 
Notice  that  the  expression  in  brackets  on  the  last  line  is  the  joint 
posterior  kernel  that  would  result  if the  restriction  on  unstable  roots 
were  not  imposed.  If not  for this  restriction,  the  model  would  have  a 
linear  Gaussian  state-space  representation,  with  transition  equation 
f(OTIV).  The posterior  kernel associated  with  this linear transition  law is 
pL(0,  V | yT) ocf(yT  |  T, V)f(OVTV)p(V).  (2.19) 
Substituting  this relation into the last equation,  the posterior density  for 
the nonlinear  model  can be expressed  as a truncation of the posterior for 
the unrestricted  linear model, 
p(OT, V | yT)  c I(0T)pL(0T,  V | YT).  (2.20) 
Among  other things,  this means  that p(0T,  V IyT)  can be represented  and 
simulated  in  two  steps.  First, we  derive  the  posterior  associated  with 
linear  transition  equation,  pL(0T, V I yT),  and  then  we  multiply  by  I(0T) to 
rule out explosive  outcomes.  In the Monte Carlo simulation,  this is imple- 
mented  by simulating  the unrestricted posterior and rejecting draws that 
violate the stability condition.  The next subsection  describes  our method 
for  simulating  pL(OT, V I  yT),  and  the  one  after  that  confirms  the  validity 
of our rejection sampling  procedure. 
2.5 SIMULATING  THE  UNRESTRICTED  POSTERIOR 
Following  Kim and Nelson  (1999), we use the Gibbs sampler to simulate 
draws from pL(0T, V I  yT).  The Gibbs sampler iterates on two operations. 
First, conditional  on the data and hyperparameters,  we draw a history of 340 *  COGLEY  & SARGENT 
states  from pL(OT YT,  V).  Then,  conditional  on  the  data and  states,  we 
draw  hyperparameters  from PL(V  I yT,  T).  Subject to regularity  condi- 
tions (see Roberts and Smith 1992), the sequence  of draws converges  to a 
draw from the joint distribution,  pL(OT,  V I yT). 
2.5.1.  Gibbs Step 1: States Given Hyperparameters Conditional  on  data 
and  hyperparameters,  the  unrestricted  transition  law  is linear and  has 
normal innovations.  Thus,  the virtual states  are Gaussian, 
pL(0T  j yT  V)  =f(OT  yT,  V).  (2.21) 
This density  can be factored as7 
T-1 
f(OT  | YT,  V)  = f(OT  YT, V) Hf(Ot  I  t+,  Yt, V).  (2.22) 
t=l 
The leading  factor is the  marginal  posterior  for the  terminal  state,  and 
the other factors are conditional  densities  for the preceding  time periods. 
Since the conditional  densities  on the right-hand  side are Gaussian,  it is 
enough  to  update  their  conditional  means  and  variances.  This  can be 
done  via the Kalman filter. 
Deriving forward and backward recursions forf(OTIYT,  V) is straightfor- 
ward.  Going  forward in time,  let 
Otlt  E(OtYt,  V), 
Pt1t-1  Var(0t  I  t-1, V),  (2.23) 
Ptt  Var(Ot I yt,  V). 
represent  conditional  means  and variances.  These  are computed  recur- 
sively,  starting from 0 and P, by iterating on 
Kt =  (Ptlt-  Xt +  C)(XXPtltlXt  +  R  +  X' C +  C'Xt)-l, 
Otlt  =  Ot-llt-l  +  Kt(yt  -  Xt  Kt-llt-l) 
(2.24) 
Pt1t-  =  Pt-lit-1  +  Q, 
Pt=  Ptlt-  -  Kt(X1Ptit-1  +  C'). 
7. See Kim and Nelson  (1999, Chapter 8). Evolving  Post-World  War  II U.S. Inflation  Dynamics  *  341 
The  matrix  Kt is  the  Kalman  gain.8  At  the  end  of  the  sample,  these 
iterations yield  the conditional  mean and variance for the terminal state, 
f(T  I YT, V)  =  N(OTT, PT|T).  (2.25) 
This pins  down  the first factor in (2.22). 
The  remaining  factors  in  (2.22)  are  derived  by  working  backward 
through  the  sample,  updating  means  and variances  to reflect the addi- 
tional information  about  0t contained  in 0t+.9 Let 
Ot[t+l  0  E(Ot  10t+l  ,  yt, V),  tlt%~~~~~~~~~~~~~+l 
==  ^(  ^ 
^)(2.26) 
tlt+l  Var(0t I  Ot+l,  yt V), 
represent  backward  estimates  of  the  mean  and  variance,  respectively. 
Because  the  states  are conditionally  normal,  these  can be  expressed  as 
otlt+l  =  otlt +  Ptt  Ptlt  (0t+l  - 
tt),  (2.27) 
Ptlt+l  =  Pt\t  -  PtltPt+lljtPtlt 
Therefore the remaining  elements  in the (2.22) are 
f(Ot  I Ot+l,  T 
V)  = N(Ot,t+l,  Ptl+l).  (2.28) 
Notice  that the  smoothed  covariances  depend  only  on  the  output  of 
the Kalman filter, but the smoothed  conditional  means  depend  on real- 
izations of Ot+,.  Accordingly,  a random trajectory for states may be drawn 
from  a backward  recursion.  First, draw  OT from  (2.25),  using  (2.24) to 
compute  the  mean  and  variance.  Next,  conditional  on  its  realization, 
draw  0_T1  from (2.28),  using  (2.27) to compute  the mean  and variance. 
Then draw  OT-2  conditional  on the realization  of OT_1,  and so on back to 
the beginning  of the sample. 
2.5.2  Gibbs Step 2: Hyperparameters  Given States  Conditional  on  yT  and 
0',  the innovations  are observable.  Under the unrestricted  linear transi- 
tion  law,  these  are  identically  and  independently  distributed  normal 
random variables, and their conditional  likelihood  is Gaussian.  When an 
8. The formula for Kt differs from that given  in Anderson  and Moore (1979) for the case of 
correlated  innovations  because  of  a  difference  in  assumptions  about  the  timing  of 
innovations. 
9. Notice  that the backward  recursions  are not determined  by  the  Kalman smoother.  We 
want the mean and variance forf(Otl  ,Ot,  t, V) =  tf(ot(t+,  yT  V). The Kalman smoother 
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inverse-Wishart  prior is combined  with a Gaussian likelihood,  the poste- 
rior is also an inverse-Wishart  density, 
p(VIYT, 0T)  =  IW(V1-1, T),  (2.29) 
where 
T  =  To+  T,  T  - T+  T,  (2.30) 
V  =  V+  VT, 
and VT  is proportional  to the usual  covariance estimator, 
V1_  T  - 
E )  8  (2.31)  T  T  t=1  Vt 
The posterior  degree-of-freedom  parameter  is the  sum  of the  prior de- 
grees  of freedom,  T0, plus  the degrees  of freedom  in the sample,  T. The 
posterior scale matrix is the sum of the prior and sample  sum-of-squares 
matrices.10 
To sample  from an inverse-Wishart  distribution,  we  exploit  two  facts. 
First, if a matrix V is distributed as IW(S, df), then V-1 is a Wishart matrix 
with  scale  matrix  S and  degrees  of  freedom  df.  Second,  to  simulate  a 
draw from the Wishart distribution,  we  take df independent  draws  of a 
random vector  q7i  from a N(0, S) density  and form the random matrix V-1 
-= Sid-  7ri  . Since V-1 is a draw from a Wishart density,  V is a draw from 
an inverse-Wishart  density. 
2.5.3  Summary of the Gibbs Sampler  To summarize,  the  Gibbs  sampler 
iterates  on  two  simulations,  drawing  states  conditional  on  hyperpara- 
maters  and  then  hyperparameters  conditional  on  states.  After a transi- 
tional or "burn-in" period,  the  sequence  of draws  approximates  a sam- 
ple from the virtual posterior,  pL(0T, V  yT). 
2.6 REJECTION  SAMPLING 
The  final  step  is  to  impose  the  stability  condition,  which  is  done  by 
checking  the autoregressive  roots at each date and rejecting draws with 
roots inside  the unit circle. The rejection step ensures  that the posterior 
density  puts  zero probability on explosive  outcomes. 
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To confirm  the  validity  of  this  procedure,  we  check  the  conditions 
associated  with  rejection sampling.11 The normalized  target density  is 
p(0T, V  yT)  I(O  )PL(T, 
V  yT)  (2.32) 
To perform  rejection  sampling,  we  need  a candidate  density,  g(OT, V), 
that  satisfies  three  properties.  The  candidate  density  must  be  non- 
negative  and well  defined  for all (OT, V)  for which  p(0T, V  YT) >  0, it 
must have  a finite integral, and the importance  ratio R(0T,  V) must have 
a known  upper bound  M: 
p(0T,  VY)  R(Or,v)  =  -  M <  o.  (2.33) 
A  natural  candidate  density  is  the  virtual  posterior,  pL(OT,  V  I yT). 
Because  this is a probability density,  it is non-negative  and integrates  to 
1. Since it is an unrestricted  analogue  of the target density, it is also well 
defined  for all (0T, V) which  occur with  positive  probability. Finally, the 
importance ratio is bounded  by the reciprocal of the probability of obtain- 
ing a stable draw from the virtual posterior, 
R(0T,  V)  =  I(0 T) 
ff  I(0OT)p,(0T  V  yT)  dOT  dV 
(2.34) 
1 
f  =M. 
ff  I(0  )pL(0, V I  YT) dT dV 
The denominator  is the expected  value  of I(0T) under  the virtual poste- 
rior, or the probability of a stable draw from the unrestricted  density. M 
is finite as long  as this probability is nonzero. 
Rejection sampling  proceeds  in two steps: draw a trial (0iT  Vi) from the 
virtual posterior,  and then  accept the draw with  probability  R(iT, Vi)/M. 
Since R(0T,  Vi)/M =  I(0T),  the second  step  is equivalent  to accepting  the 
trial draw  whenever  it satisfies  the  stability  condition,  and  rejecting  it 
when  it does  not. 
2.7 BELIEFS  ABOUT  THE  FUTURE 
Having  processed  data  through  date  T,  the  next  step  is  to  simulate 
future data and states.  Conditional  on hyperparameters  and the current 
11. See, e.g., Gelman  et al. (1995,  pp. 303-305). 344 *  COGLEY  & SARGENT 
state  of  the  system,  the  posterior  density  for future  data and  states  is 
quite  tractable. This density  can be factored  into  the product  of a mar- 
ginal distribution  for future states and a conditional  distribution  for fu- 
ture data, 
p(yT+1,T+H,  oT+1,T+H  lOT,  V, yT) 
=  p(oT+l,T+H  OT  V,  yT)  p(yT+1lT+H  0T+1,T+H  ,  V,  YT)  (2.35) 
Because the states are Markov, the first factor can be factored in turn into 
H 
p(OT+1'T+H  OT,  V, YT) =I1  p(OT+OT+i-  V, yT).  (2.36) 
Apart from the restriction on explosive  autoregressive  roots,  0T+1 is condi- 
tionally  normal  with  mean  0T and variance  Q. Similarly, conditional  on 
OT+1J V, and YT,  OT+2  is normally distributed with mean  OT+1 and variance Q, 
and  so  on.  Therefore,  to  sample  from  the  virtual  posterior  for future 
states,  we take H random draws of vi  from the N(O, Q) density  and iterate 
on the state equation, 
T+i  = 
T+i-1  +  Vi.  (2.37) 
The stability restriction is implemented  in the same way  as in the Gibbs 
sampler, by checking  the autoregressive  roots associated  with each draw 
and rejecting explosive  draws. 
Given  a  trajectory  for  future  states,  all  that  remains  is  to  simulate 
future data. The second  factor in (2.35) can be factored in turn into 
H 
p(yT+1,T+HoT+,T+H  , yT)  =  J7  Py  T+l,i-1,  OT+1  T+H  ,  yT)  (2.38) 
i=l 
Conditional  on  OT,  V, yT,  and a trajectory for future states,  the measure- 
ment  innovation  eT+1  is normally  distributed  with  mean  C'Q-lvT+ and 
variance  R  -  C'Q-'C.  Hence  YT+1  is  conditionally  normal  with  mean 
XT  +10T+i  + C'Q-vT+l and variance R -  C'Q-1C. Similarly,  +2 is condition- 
ally  normal  with  mean  C'Q-lvT+2  and  variance  R  -  C'Q-'C,  and  so 
on.  Therefore,  to  sample  from  (2.38),  we  take  H random  draws  of  ,e 
from  a N(C'Q-lvT+i, R  -  C'Q-'C)  density  and  iterate  on  the  measure- 
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YT+i  =  XTiT+i  +  i =  1,  .  . .  , H,  (2.39) 
using  lags of YT+i  to compute  XT,i. 
2.8 COLLECTING  THE  PIECES 
Combining  the results of the previous  sections,  (2.16) can be expressed  as 
p(yT+l,T+H,  0T+1,T+H, 
T  V 
yT)  =p(OT,  V  | Y) 
H 
x  H p(0T+i,  IT+i-1 V, yT) 
i=l 
H 
x  P(YT+,IT+l,1" oT+1'T+H,  O  V  yT).  (2.40) 
i=1 
To sample  from this distribution,  we  use  the Gibbs sampler  to simulate 
a draw from p(0T, VI yT).  Then,  conditional  on that draw, we  simulate  a 
trajectory for future states, and conditional  on both of those we simulate a 
trajectory for future data. This provides  the raw material for our analysis. 
3.  Stylized  Facts  about  the  Evolving  Law  of  Motion 
We study  data on  inflation,  unemployment,  and  a short-term  nominal 
interest  rate. Inflation is measured  using  the CPI for all urban consum- 
ers, unemployment  is the civilian unemployment  rate, and the nominal 
interest  rate is  the  yield  on  3-month  Treasury bills.  The  inflation  and 
unemployment  data  are  quarterly  and  seasonally  adjusted,  and  the 
Treasury-bill data are the average of daily rates in the first month of each 
quarter. The sample  runs from 1948.1 to 2000.4. We work with a VAR(2) 
specification  for inflation,  the  logit  of unemployment,  and  the  ex post 
real interest rate.12 
To  calibrate  the  prior,  we  estimate  a  time-invariant  vector  auto- 
regression  using data for 1948.1-1958.4.  The mean of the virtual prior, 0, 
is the point  estimate;  P is its asymptotic  covariance  matrix; and R is the 
innovation  covariance matrix. To initialize the other hyperparameters,  we 
assume  that C = 0 and that Q is proportional to P. To  begin conservatively, 
we start with a minor perturbation from a time-invariant  representation, 
setting  Q =  (0.01)2P. In other words,  our prior is that time variation ac- 
12. The  unemployment  rate is  bounded  between  0 and  1,  and  the  logit  transformation 
maps  this  into  (-oo,  o),  which  is more  consonant  with  our Gaussian  approximating 
model.  To ensure  that  posterior  draws  for unemployment  lie  between  0 and  1,  we 
simulate  logit(ut) and use  the inverse  logit  transformation.  The non-negativity  bound 
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counts  for only  1% of the  standard  deviation  of each parameter.13 The 
prior degrees  of freedom,  To,  are equal to those in the preliminary sample. 
This is an informative  prior, but only weakly  so.  Because the prelimi- 
nary sample  contains  only 4.5 data points  per VAR parameter,  the prior 
mean is just a ballpark number and the prior variance allows for a substan- 
tial range of outcomes.  As time passes,  the prior becomes  progressively 
less influential  and the likelihood  comes  to dominate  the posterior. 
The simulation  strategy  follows  the algorithm  described  above.  Start- 
ing  in  1965.4,  we  compute  posterior  densities  for  each  year  through 
2000, for a total of 36 years. At each date, we perform 10,000 iterations of 
the  Gibbs  sampler,  discarding  the  first  2000  to  let  the  Markov  chain 
converge  to  its  ergodic  distribution.14 Then,  conditional  on  those  out- 
comes,  we  generate  8000  trajectories  of  future  data  and  states.  Each 
posterior  trajectory is 120 quarters long  and contains  information  about 
both short- and long-run  features of the data. 
3.1 OBJECTS  OF INTEREST 
We initially focus on three features of the data: long-horizon  forecasts of 
inflation  and  unemployment,  the  spectrum  for inflation,  and  selected 
parameters of a version  of the Taylor rule for monetary policy. The long- 
horizon  forecasts  approximate  core inflation  and the natural rate of un- 
employment,  the spectrum  encodes  information  about the variance, per- 
sistence,  and predictability  of inflation,  and  the Taylor-rule parameters 
summarize  the  changes  in monetary  policy  that underlie  the  changing 
nature of inflation. 
We are interested  in these  features because  they play a role in theories 
about the rise and fall of U.S.  inflation.  For example,  Parkin (1993) and 
Ireland  (1999) point  out  that  the  magnitude  of  inflationary  bias  in the 
Kydland-Prescott  (1977) and Barro-Gordon  (1983) model  depends  posi- 
tively  on  the  natural  rate  of  unemployment.  Taylor (1997,  1998) and 
Sargent (1999) argue that core inflation depends  on the monetary  author- 
ity's beliefs  about the natural-rate hypothesis,  which  in turn depend  on 
the degree  of inflation persistence.  In particular, the model presented  in 
Sargent (1999) imposes  a definite restriction on the joint evolution  of core 
inflation and the degree of persistence,  which we discuss  below. Changes 
13. The Gibbs sampler quickly adds more time variation to the system. 
14. Recursive  mean  graphs  suggest  rough  convergence,  though  some  wiggling  persists 
beyond  the  burn-in  period.  We  checked  our  results  by  performing  a much  longer 
simulation  based  on  data  through  2000.4.  The  longer  simulation  involved  106,000 
draws  from the  Gibbs  sampler,  the  first 18,000 of which  were  discarded  to allow  for 
convergence.  Smoothed  estimates  based  on this  simulation  were  qualitatively  similar 
to the  filtered  estimates  reported  in the  text.  Indeed,  we  also performed  calculations 
based  on  a burn-in  period  of 98,000 and found  that the  results  were  much  the same. Evolving  Post-World  War  II U.S. Inflation  Dynamics  *  347 
in beliefs  about  the  natural-rate  hypothesis  should  also  be  reflected  in 
Taylor-rule parameters. 
3.2 CORE  INFLATION  AND THE  NATURAL  RATE 
OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
Beveridge  and Nelson  (1981) define  a stochastic  trend in terms of long- 
horizon  forecasts.  For a driftless random variable like inflation or unem- 
ployment,  the Beveridge-Nelson  trend is defined  as the value  to which 
the series is expected  to converge  once the transients  die out, 
Tt  =lim  Etxt+h.  (3.1) 
Assuming  that  expectations  of  inflation  and  unemployment  converge 
to  the  core  and  natural  rates  as  the  forecast  horizon  lengthens,  the 
latter can be approximated  using  this measure.15 Because  the posterior 
distributions  are skewed  and have  fat tails,  we  modify  the  Beveridge- 
Nelson  definition  by  substituting  the  posterior  median  for the  mean. 
We approximate  core  inflation  and  the  natural  rate of  unemployment 
by  setting  h  =  120 quarters  and  finding  the  median  of  the  posterior 
predictive  density, 
ct = medt(1Tt120),  (3.2) 
unt =  medt(ut+120). 
Estimates of core inflation  and the natural rate are shown  in Figure 1. 
The circles represent  inflation,  and the crosses  unemployment.  Accord- 
ing  to this  measure,  core  inflation  was  between  1.75%  and  4% in the  late 
1960s. It rose throughout  the  1970s and peaked  at roughly  8% in 1979- 
1980. Thereafter it fell quickly, and it has fluctuated between  2.25% and 
3.25% since the mid-1980s.  Core inflation  was just shy  of 3% at the end 
of 2000. 
The  natural  rate  of  unemployment  also  rose  throughout  the  1970s, 
reaching  a peak of 6.6% in 1980. It declined  gradually  in the early 1980s 
and  fluctuated  between  5.5% and  6% from the  mid-1980s  to  the  mid- 
1990s. The natural rate again began  to fall after 1994 and was  a bit less 
than  5% at the  end  of  2000. 
A scatterplot,  shown  in Figure 2, provides  a better visual image of the 
association  between  the  two.  The  simple  correlation  is  0.63,  which  is 
rather remarkable given  the  difficulty  of measuring  these  components. 
15. Hall (1999) recommends  an unconditional  mean  of unemployment  as an estimator  of 
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Figure 1 CORE INFLATION AND  THE NATURAL RATE OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
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The  two  series  rise  and  fall  together,  in  accordance  with  Parkin  and 
Ireland's theory. 
As  a reality check  for the  model,  Figures  3 and  4 report the  cyclical 
components  of inflation  and  unemployment,  measured  by  subtracting 
the  median  Beveridge-Nelson  trend  estimates  from the  actual values. 
We include  these  plots  to  confirm  that  the  model  captures  important 
features of the data. The first figure shows  that the estimated  peaks and 
troughs  occur  at the  right  times  and  are of  plausible  magnitude.  For 
example,  unemployment  was  well  above  the natural rate following  the 
recessions  of 1975 and 1982. Using  Okun's  law as a rule of thumb,  these 
estimates  correspond  to "output  gaps"  of roughly  6.75% and  12.5% re- 
spectively.  The model  also  correctly predicts  that  the  high  inflation  of 
1974-1975  and 1980-1981  would  be partially reversed. 
Figure 4 shows  a scatterplot of the cyclical components  and illustrates 
two other characteristics of the data. The first is that the components  are 
asymmetric,  with  large  positive  deviations  occurring  more  often  than 
large  negative  ones.  Second,  from  1967  until  1983,  there  were  large 
counterclockwise  loops  in inflation  and unemployment,  with  increases 
in  inflation  leading  increases  in  unemployment.  After  1986, the  loops 
were  smaller  but  still  mostly  counterclockwise.  The  direction  of  the 
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Figure 4 CYCLICAL COMPONENTS  OF INFLATION AND 
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loops  is consistent  with  other evidence  on the cyclical relation between 
inflation  and economic  activity, e.g.  as summarized  by Taylor (1999). 
Beveridge-Nelson  measures  often  suggest  that all the  variation  is in 
the  trend,  a feature  to which  many  economists  object.  Our model  does 
not have  this feature. 
3.3  THE PERSISTENCE, VARIANCE, AND  PREDICTABILITY 
OF INFLATION 
Next we consider  the evolution  of the second  moments  of inflation.  This 
information  is encoded  in the spectrum,  and its evolution  is illustrated in 
Figures 5 through  7. 
Figure  5 shows  the  median  posterior  spectrum  for each  year  in the 
sample.  This  figure  was  generated  as  follows.  For each  year,  we  esti- 
mated  a spectrum  for each inflation  trajectory in the posterior predictive 
density.  Then we  computed  a median  spectrum by taking the median  of 
the  estimates  on  a frequency-by-frequency  basis.16 This yields  a single 
16. The ordinates  are asymptotically  independent  across frequencies. 
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Figure 5 MEDIAN POSTERIOR SPECTRUM FOR INFLATION 
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Figure  7 LOG  OF THE  MEDIAN  POSTERIOR  SPECTRUM  FOR  INFLATION 
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slice  of  the  figure,  relating  power  to  frequency  for  a  given  year.  By 
repeating  this for each year, we produced  the three-dimensional  surface 
shown  in the figure.  We emphasize  that these  are predictive  measures, 
which  represent  expected  variation  going  forward  in time.  That is,  the 
slice  associated  with  a  given  year  represents  a prediction  about  how 
inflation  is  likely  to  vary  in  the  future,  conditional  on  data  up  to  the 
current date.17 
The most significant  feature of this graph is the variation over time in 
the magnitude  of low-frequency  power.  Since the spectral densities  have 
Granger's (1966) typical shape,  we can interpret low-frequency  power  as 
a measure  of inflation  persistence.  According  to this measure,  inflation 
was weakly  persistent  in the 1960s and 1990s, when  there was little low- 
frequency  power,  but  strongly  persistent  in the  late  1970s, when  there 
was  a lot. Indeed,  the degree  of persistence  peaked  in 1979-1980,  at the 
same time as the peak in core inflation. 
Figures  6 and  7 report results  for selected  years.  Here,  circles repre- 
sent  1965, crosses  1979, and asterisks  2000. Figure 6 plots  the spectrum, 
17. We also calculated  an alternative local linear approximation  using  the VAR representa- 
tion and the mean posterior  state at each date. The results were similar to those  shown 
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and Figure 7 plots  its logarithm.  To interpret the figures,  recall that the 
total variance is the integral of the spectrum, 
a  1 
2 fr  (w)  do,  (3.3) 
and that the log of the univariate  innovation  variance can be expressed 
as the integral of the log of the spectrum, 
In or-  =  I  ln f,(o)  dco.  (3.4) 
The functionf(co)  is the spectrum at frequency  c,  a2i  is the variance, and 
or2 is the error variance  for one-step-ahead  univariate  forecasts  of infla- 
tion.  The former measures  long-run  uncertainty  about inflation; the lat- 
ter, short-run uncertainty. 
Looking  first at Figure 6, we  can say  something  about how  the  total 
variance  has  changed  over  time.  Between  1965 and  1979, inflation  be- 
came smoother  but more persistent.  That is,  there was  less  variation at 
high  and medium  frequencies,  especially  those  associated  with business 
cycles  (say 4 to 20 quarters per cycle), but more variation at low frequen- 
cies,  especially  those  corresponding  to  cycles  lasting  5 years  or more. 
The increase in low-frequency  power  was greater in magnitude  than the 
decrease  in  high-frequency  power,  so  the  total  variance  was  greater. 
Thus,  the increase  in variance  during  the late 1960s and 1970s reflected 
an increase in inflation persistence. 
Between  1979 and 2000, the spectrum for inflation fell at all frequencies, 
and  therefore  so  did  the  total  variance.  But the  decline  in power  was 
greatest at low frequencies,  especially at those greater than 20 quarters per 
cycle. In other words,  the diminished  degree  of inflation  persistence  ac- 
counted  for most of the decline in variance in this period.  Thus the evolu- 
tion  of  the  variance  has  been  closely  associated  with  that  of  inflation 
persistence.  Inflation  became  more  persistent  and more  variable in the 
1970s, and less persistent  and less variable in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Figure  7 is relevant  for short-term  forecasting  and  tells  a somewhat 
different  story. The increase in the log of low-frequency  power  between 
1965 and 1979 was  smaller in magnitude  than the decrease  in the log of 
high-frequency  power.  Thus,  although  inflation became  more persistent 
and more variable during the 1970s, it also became  easier to predict one 
quarter ahead.  In other words,  although  there was  more long-term  un- 
certainty in 1979, there was actually less short-term uncertainty. Between 354 *  COGLEY  & SARGENT 
1979 and  2000,  the  log  spectrum  fell  at  all  frequencies,  and  inflation 
became even  easier to forecast one quarter ahead.  By 2000 there was less 
uncertainty  at both long  and short horizons. 
The next  two  figures  provide  more  information  about  prediction  er- 
rors. Figure 8 is a multivariate  analogue  of Figure 7 and is related to the 
total prediction  variance  for the  system.  To interpret  this  figure,  recall 
that the total prediction  variance,  IV,,, for a vector time series Yt  can be 
expressed  in terms of the log of the determinant  of the spectral density, 
ln|VlE  =  2  lnlF(w)l  dw,  (3.5) 
where  V, is the covariance matrix for innovations  based on the history of 
Yt, and FM,(w)  is the spectral density  matrix. Whittle (1953) interprets  Ve 
as a measure  of the  total random  variation  entering  the  system  at each 
date. 
Unlike the univariate measure,  the total prediction  variance increased 
between  1965 and  1979.  For the  system  as  a whole,  there  was  only  a 
slight  decrease  in variation  at business-cycle  frequencies,  and  this  was 
Figure  8 LOG  DETERMINANT  OF THE  MEAN POSTERIOR  SPECTRAL 
DENSITY  MATRIX  IN SELECTED  YEARS 
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Figure 9 STANDARD  DEVIATION OF ONE-STEP-AHEAD  VAR PREDICTION 
ERRORS 
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more  than  offset by  a substantial  increase  in variation  at low  and high 
frequencies.  Between  1979 and  2000, the  system  became  more  predict- 
able, with lnlFyy(w)l  falling at all frequencies.  This more than reversed  the 
increase  in  the  earlier period.  By the  end  of 2000,  the  total prediction 
variance  was  40% smaller  than  in  1979 and  30% smaller  than  in  1965. 
Thus,  for the  system  as a whole,  the  degree  of short-term  uncertainty 
has fallen substantially. 
Figure 9 reports  the  variance  of VAR forecast  errors over  the  period 
1965-2000  and  provides  more  detail  about  the  evolution  of  short-run 
uncertainty.  At  each  date,  the  posterior  prediction  error variance  was 
computed  by  averaging  across  realizations  of  the  posterior  predictive 
density,  one  quarter ahead.  For inflation  and ex post  real interest rates, 
there has been  a downward  trend in short-term uncertainty  since  1965, 
punctuated  by an increase in 1974 and again in 1978-1982.  According  to 
this  measure,  the  VAR innovation  variance  for  inflation  fell  by  21% 
between  1979 and 2000 and by 42% for the period as a whole.  In contrast, 
the forecast error variance  for unemployment  fluctuated  until the early 
1980s, rising and falling with  the business  cycle.  Since then it has fallen 
steadily  to less than one-third its peak level.  Changes in short-run uncer- 356 *  COGLEY & SARGENT 
Figure 10 CORE INFLATION AND  INFLATION PERSISTENCE 
/I  l  ~Y  I  -e-  Median  Inflation 
/ \  Persistence  of Inflation 
0.07 - 
0.06 - 
0.05-  / 
0.04 - 
0.03-  -\ 
0.02- 
/,/  \ 
pl:~l??-..-  t?.  .  4  "i--?-i?-?--  ? 
1965  1970  1975  1980  195  190  1995  2000 
Year 
tainty  about unemployment  account  for much  of the rise and fall of the 
total  prediction  variance.18 
Finally,  in  Figures  10 and  11,  we  relate  changes  in  core  inflation  to  the 
evolution  of the  variance  and  degree  of persistence  of inflation.  Figure  10 
plots  core  inflation  and  the  spectrum  at frequency  zero,  which  summa- 
rizes  the  degree  of  persistence.  The  two  are  very  closely  related.  Both 
rose  in  the  1960s  and  1970s,  and  both  fell  during  and  after  the  Volcker 
disinflation.  The  simple  correlation  is  0.915. 
Because  persistence  contributes  to  variance,  core  inflation  also  co- 
varies  positively  with  the  long-horizon  standard  deviation  of  inflation, 
as shown  in Figure  11.19 Again,  both  measures  rose  during  the  1970s  and 
fell  during  the  1980s  and  1990s.  The  correlation  between  the  mean  and 
standard  deviation  is 0.783.  This  is  a bit lower  than  the  previous  correla- 
tion  because  the  variance  includes  changes  in  both  low-  and  high- 
frequency  power,  and  the  latter  are  less  highly  correlated  with  changes 
in  core  inflation.  Thus  the  well-known  positive  correlation  between  the 
18. Although  our  model  assumes  that  V is  constant,  the  figures  illustrate  that  filtered 
estimates  do shift little by little over time, thus introducing  a limited degree of variation 
in shock variances.  This variation may reflect a transient adaptation  to the kind of shifts 
emphasized  by our discussants. 
19. We focus on the long-horizon  variance, vart,(rt+12),  in order to let the transients die out. Evolving  Post-World  War  II U.S. Inflation  Dynamics  ?  357 
Figure 11 CORE  INFLATION  AND THE  STANDARD  DEVIATION  OF 
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mean  and variance  of inflation  reflects an even  stronger  correlation be- 
tween  the mean  and degree  of persistence. 
3.4 TAYLOR-RULE  PARAMETERS 
At  the  end  of  the  day, we  hope  to  interpret  the  evolution  of  inflation 
dynamics  in terms of the changing  behavior  of central bankers.  Accord- 
ingly, we also investigate  the evolution  of the parameters of a Taylor rule. 
A simple form of the Taylor rule posits  that the central bank's nominal 
interest  target,  i,  varies  positively  with  inflation  and  negatively  with 
unemployment, 
it*= (r* +  r*) +  (Tt_,j -  7*) +  y(ut_  -  u*),  (3.6) 
where  -7*, u*, and  r* represent  target  values  for inflation,  unemploy- 
ment,  and the real interest rate, respectively.  The lags in the relationship 
reflect the fact that current observations  on inflation and unemployment 
are often  unavailable  to policymakers,  especially  early in the  quarter.20 
20. This is relevant in our case because  the interest rate is sampled  in the first month  of the 
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Therefore  decisions  are based  on  lagged  values  of inflation  and  unem- 
ployment.  The  basic  Taylor rule  is  usually  augmented  with  a  policy 
shock  m/t  and  a  partial  adjustment  formula  to  allow  for  interest-rate 
smoothing, 
Ait  = p(L)(it*- it-)  +  rt.  (3.7) 
Cast in this form, the Taylor rule can be represented  as the interest-rate 
equation  in  a vector  autoregression  for inflation,  unemployment,  and 
nominal  interest rates. 
In an alternative  form of the Taylor rule,  decisions  about  the ex ante 
real interest  rate  depend  on  lags  of  inflation,  unemployment,  and  ex 
post  real rates, 
it -  Et,_t  =  -A  +  8(L)iTt-  +  y(L)ut-1  +  P(L)(it-l  -  't-)  +  it.  (3.8) 
By substituting  7rt  =  Et_l't + st,  this form can be cast as the real-interest 
equation  in a vector autoregression  for inflation,  unemployment,  and ex 
post  real rates, with  a composite  innovation  consisting  of policy  shocks 
and inflation prediction  errors, 
it -  7t  =  I  +  f(L)it-  1 +  y(L)ut-1  +  p(L)(it-  -  t-1)  +  (t-  t).  (3.9) 
This is the  form of the  Taylor rule that we  shall  study.21 In response  to 
our discussants,  we  concede  that it is controversial  to interpret the sys- 
tematic part of the monetary  policy  rule as the projection  of real interest 
rates only on past information.  By orthogonalizing  an innovation  covari- 
ance  matrix  in  a  particular  order,  many  studies  attribute  part  of  the 
contemporaneous  covariance  among  innovations  to the  monetary  rule 
(i.e.,  the rule for setting interest rates responds  to contemporary  informa- 
tion).  We also  recognize  that the  shapes  of impulse  response  functions 
for the  response  of macroeconomic  aggregates  to  the  monetary  policy 
shock  can  depend  sensitively  on  how  much  of  the  contemporaneous 
innovation  volatility is swept  into the monetary  shock.  In defense  of our 
choice,  we  note  that among  others  McCallum and Nelson  (1999) doubt 
that monetary  authorities  have  timely  and reliable enough  reports to let 
them respond  to what  the vector autoregression  measures  as contempo- 
raneous  information.22 
21. Actually,  we substitute  the logit of unemployment for unemployment. 
22. It would have been possible for us to condition on contemporaneous  information  by 
using the time t estimate of the R component of V to orthogonalize R as desired, 
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The literature on monetary  policy  rules emphasizes  several  aspects  of 
central-bank  behavior.  We  focus  on  two  elements  that  are  especially 
relevant to the evolution  of the law of motion  for inflation. One concerns 
the evolution  of target inflation,  u*, and the other concerns the evolution 
of the degree  of activism. 
The value  of target inflation cannot be identified  from the interest-rate 
equation  alone.  But assuming  that the central bank adjusts interest rates 
so  that  inflation  eventually  converges  to  its  target,  this  value  can  be 
estimated  by  computing  long-horizon  forecasts  using  the  entire vector 
autoregression.  Under  this  assumption,  target  and  core  inflation  are 
synonymous.  Evidence  on  this  feature  of  the  policy  rule  is  reported 
above,  in Figure 1. 
Another  important issue  concerns whether  a rule is activist or passivist, 
a  distinction  that  bears  on  the  determinacy  of  equilibrium  (e.g.,  see 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 2000). A policy  rule is activist if, other things 
equal,  the  central bank  increases  the  nominal  interest  rate more  than 
one-for-one  in response  to an increase  in inflation,  so that the real inter- 
est rate increases.  A passivist  central bank adjusts the nominal  interest 
rate one-for-one  or less,  so that the real interest remains constant or falls 
as inflation  rises.  In the  real-interest  version  of the Taylor rule,  the  de- 
gree of activism  can be measured  by 
W(1) 
A=  .  (3.10) 
1 -  p(l) 
A policy  rule is activist if A >  0. 
Because  our version  of the Taylor rule is the real-interest  equation  in 
the vector  autoregression,  the  posterior  density  for the  activism  coeffi- 
cient can be computed  directly from the posterior density  for the states. 
The output  of the Gibbs sampler at date t includes  the terminal state,  Ot, 
and for each draw of the terminal state we calculate the implied value for 
A. Conditional  on data up to date t, this measures  the degree  of activism 
that would  be forecast going  forward from date t. 
Posterior  beliefs  about  A  are  illustrated  in  Figure  12.  Because  of 
outliers  in the posterior  density,  the figure graphs the posterior  median 
and  interquartile  range.23 The figure  has  two  salient  features.  First, as 
reported  by  Clarida,  Gali,  and  Gertler,  there  have  been  important 
changes  in  the  degree  of activism  over  time.  Judging  by  the  posterior 
median,  which  is marked by circles, the  degree  of activism  declined  in 
23. The outliers result from division  by 1 -  p(l),  which  sometimes  takes on values  close to 
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Figure  12 POSTERIOR  MEDIAN  AND INTERQUARTILE  RANGE  FOR  THE 
ACTIVISM  COEFFICIENT 
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the late 1960s and was  approximately  neutral in the early 1970s. For the 
remainder  of  the  1970s,  the  rule  was  decidedly  passive,  allowing  real 
interest  rates to fall as inflation  rose.  Monetary policy  started becoming 
activist  in  1981 and  continued  to  grow  more  activist  until  the  end  of 
Volcker's term. During  the first half of Greenspan's  term, policy  drifted 
toward  a less  active  stance,  perhaps  reflecting  the  "opportunistic"  ap- 
proach  to  disinflation.  But policy  has  again  grown  more  activist  since 
1993, surpassing  the peak achieved  at the end of the Volcker years. 
The second  notable feature concerns the dispersion  of beliefs about the 
degree of activism. Judging by the interquartile range, beliefs were tightly 
concentrated  only  in the  1970s, when  monetary  policy  was  passive.  At 
that time, there seemed  to be little doubt,  for better or worse,  about how 
the Fed was  doing  business.  The periods  before  and after both  involve 
more uncertainty about the degree of activism. In the 1960s, the lower end 
of the interquartile range straddled the boundary  of the activist region.  In 
the  Volcker-Greenspan  years,  the  interquartile  range  was  wider  but 
safely within  the activist region. 
Figure  13 shows  how  the  activism  parameter  has  covaried  with  core 
inflation  and  the  degree  of  inflation  persistence.24  The  latter both  in- 
24. The variables are measured  in standard units in order to put them on a common  basis. Evolving Post-World War  II U.S. Inflation Dynamics *  361 
Figure  13 CORE  INFLATION,  INFLATION  PERSISTENCE,  AND POLICY 
ACTIVISM 
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creased during the 1970s experiment  with a passivist  monetary rule, and 
they  both  fell  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  as policy  became  more  activist.  The 
correlation  between  the  degree  of  activism  and  core inflation  is  -0.69 
over the full sample  and  -0.87  in the Volcker-Greenspan  era. Similarly, 
the correlation between  the activism  and persistence  measures  is  -0.46 
over the full sample  and  -0.76  in the Volcker-Greenspan  years.  Thus, 
as one  might  expect,  there is an inverse  relation between  the degree  of 
activism on the one hand and core inflation  and inflation persistence  on 
the other. 
4.  Testing  the  Natural-Rate  Hypothesis 
Figures  14 through  16 summarize  the  consequences  of  implementing 
econometric  tests of the natural-rate hypothesis  along the lines of Solow 
(1968), Tobin (1968), Gordon  (1970), and many  others.  They  tested  the 
natural-rate  hypothesis  by  regressing  inflation  on  its  own  lags  along 
with  current and lagged  values  of unemployment, 
t  =  I0  +  Pl(L)ITt-1  +  (2(L)ut  +  et.  (4.1) 362 *  COGLEY & SARGENT 
Figure 14 RECURSIVE  TESTS OF THE NATURAL-RATE HYPOTHESIS 
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diamonds  represent 
They  interpreted  the  condition  f3(1)  =  1 as  evidence  in  favor  of  the 
natural-rate hypothesis,  and  J3(1) <  1 as evidence  in favor of a long-run 
trade-off.  25 
The outcomes  of recursive  natural-rate  tests  are shown  in Figure 14. 
The initial estimates  are based  on data from 1948 through  1964, allowing 
for lags at the beginning  of the sample.  On the right-hand  side  of equa- 
tion  (4.1), we  include  two  lags  of inflation  along  with  the current value 
and two  lags of unemployment.  Starting in 1965.1, new  data are added 
one  quarter at a time,  and  /i1(1) and  its  t-ratio are updated  using  the 
25. The thought  experiment  in play imagines  the consequences  of a permanent  increase in 
expected  inflation,  which  is proxied  by  the  lagged  inflation  terms  on  the  right-hand 
side.  In order for this to be neutral in the long  run,  it must  be the case that this has a 
one-for-one  effect on actual inflation,  so that f,(1)  =  1. Assuming  that current unem- 
ployment  is  predetermined  with  respect  to  current  inflation,  this  regression  can be 
estimated  by least squares.  King and Watson (1997) point out that the last assumption 
follows  from  the  structure  of vintage  1960s Keynesian  models,  in which  unemploy- 
ment  and inflation  were  determined  in a block recursive  fashion.  Unemployment  was 
determined  by  aggregate  demand  and  Okun's  law.  Taking unemployment  as given, 
inflation was  determined  by a Phillips-curve  relation for wages  and a markup equation 
for prices. 
2000 
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Kalman filter. The figure  plots  the  resulting  sequence  of t-statistics  for 
131(1)  -  1. Points marked with a circle represent  OLS estimates,  and those 
marked  with  a diamond  represent  discounted  least-squares  (DLS) esti- 
mates.  For the  latter,  the  gain  parameter  was  gt =  max(l/t,-1  ).26  The 
horizontal  line marks the 1% critical value  for a one-sided  test. 
Sargent  (1971) pointed  out that this approach  is valid only if the sam- 
ple used  to estimate  31(1)  contains  permanent  shifts  in inflation.  Other- 
wise  the  data are uninformative  for the  thought  experiment,  and  I3(1) 
could  be  less  than  1 even  if there were  no  long-run  trade-off.  Thus,  as 
the degree  of inflation persistence  in the sample  varies over time,  so too 
will outcomes  of the test. 
Early versions  of the test,  based  on samples  in which  there was  little 
inflation  persistence,  found  estimates  of P1(1) <  1 and were  interpreted 
as evidence  in favor of a long-run  trade-off.  As shown  in the figure,  the 
natural-rate  hypothesis  was  strongly  rejected  through  1973. Later ver- 
sions were based  on samples  containing  more inflation persistence,  and 
they  fail to reject long-run  neutrality.  Indeed,  from the mid-1970s  until 
the mid-1980s  there was  very little evidence  against long-run  neutrality. 
Since  then,  as  the  degree  of  inflation  persistence  has  fallen,  evidence 
against the natural-rate hypothesis  has grown. 
Figure  15  illustrates  the  relation  between  inflation  persistence  and 
outcomes  of the test.27 The figure confirms  that the test statistic is posi- 
tively  related to the degree  of persistence,  though  the relation is nonlin- 
ear. Once there was enough  persistence  to identify the long run trade-off 
parameter,  the test began  to accept long-run  neutrality,  and further in- 
creases  in persistence  no  longer  increased  the  t-ratio. Figure 16 shows 
that the test statistic is also positively  related with core inflation. Without 
alterations,  the model  of Sims  (1988), Chung  (1990), and Sargent  (1999) 
cannot  explain  that  pattern.  In  that  model,  persistence  rises  and  the 
natural-rate hypothesis  is learned as inflation falls, so the model predicts 
an inverse  relation between  core inflation  and  the  outcome  of the  test. 
The pattern  shown  in Figure  16 is more  consistent  with  an alternative 
story, in which  the  upward  drift in inflation  taught  the  government  to 
accept the natural-rate hypothesis  via the Solow-Tobin  test. 
Thus,  though  the Solow-Tobin  procedure  provided  a valid test of the 
natural-rate hypothesis  only when  inflation had become  sufficiently  per- 
sistent,  by the mid-1970s  inflation  had become  persistent  enough  to let 
the test detect  the natural rate. Therefore the Solow-Tobin  econometric 
26. There are only  minor  differences  between  the  two  estimators  within  the  sample,  be- 
cause  until  recently  1/t >  1-  . The distinction  between  constant  and  decreasing  gain 
estimators  matters more when  we  consider  the likely outcomes  of future tests. 
27. These  figures  refer to discounted  least-squares  estimates,  but the results  for OLS esti- 
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procedures  gave  policymakers  information  that  should  have  caused 
them to stabilize inflation if they had the preferences  attributed to them, 
for example,  by  Kydland  and  Prescott  (1977). For when  a policymaker 
solves  the  problem  of  minimizing  an  expected  discounted  sum  of  a 
quadratic loss function  in inflation  and unemployment  subject to a Phil- 
lips curve like (4.1), and when  the policymaker  accepts the natural-rate 
hypothesis  in the  form in which  Solow  and Tobin cast it,  then  for dis- 
count  factors  large  enough,  the  policymaker  will  soon  push  average 
inflation  to zero.28 When  Volcker took control,  the advice  to push  infla- 
tion  quickly  toward  zero  came  even  from  those  models  and  optimal- 
control  exercises  that  took  inadequate  account  of  the  Lucas  critique, 
because  they rested on the Solow-Tobin  test. 
However,  the  strong  inflation  persistence  that  induced  the  Solow- 
Tobin test  to detect  the  natural rate in the  mid-1970s  depended  on  the 
monetary  authority's  having  recently  allowed  inflation  to drift upward, 
perhaps  in response  to its earlier erroneous  views  about an exploitable 
trade-off. If the government's  success  in lowering  inflation created lower 
persistence  in inflation,  the Solow-Tobin  test could  one day again point 
to an exploitable  trade-off that would  tempt later monetary authorities to 
use  inflation  to fight unemployment.  That possibility  has worried  John 
Taylor and others,  an issue  to which  we now  turn. 
5.  Taylor's  Warning  about  Recidivism 
Recently, John Taylor (1998) has warned  about recidivism  on the natural- 
rate hypothesis.  Taylor notes  that inflation  is lower  and more  stable in 
the current monetary  regime,  and he points  out that as such data accu- 
mulate,  erroneous  econometric  tests  of  long-run  neutrality  may  again 
begin  to suggest  the existence  of a trade-off.  To the extent  that the tests 
undermine  confidence  in  the  natural-rate  hypothesis,  they  could  also 
undermine  support  for a low-inflation  policy.  In this  section,  we  offer 
quantitative evidence  to back up Taylor's warning.  The evidence  is based 
on the posterior predictive  density  conditioned  on data through the end 
of 2000. We use  this to make predictions  about the probability  of reject- 
ing the natural-rate hypothesis  going  forward in time. 
Figure 14 suggests  that Taylor's concern  has  some  merit, because  by 
the end of the sample  conventional  tests were close to rejecting p1(1) = 1 
28. This is a version  of the control problem  described  by Phelps  (1967) and Sargent (1999). 
Long  ago,  Albert  Ando  pointed  out  that  good  macroeconometric  models  had  con- 
firmed  the  absence  of  a long-run  inflation-unemployment  trade-off  by  the  early  or 
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against  Pf(1) <  1 at the 5% level.  The in-sample  evidence  is marginal,29 
however,  and  it  is  an  open  question  whether  stronger  evidence  will 
emerge  as data from a low-inflation  regime  accumulate.  To address  this 
question,  we  compute  the posterior  predictive  density  of natural rate t- 
ratios going forward in time from 2000.4. Then we calculate the probabil- 
ity,  conditioned  on  what  we  know  now,  of  rejecting  the  natural-rate 
hypothesis  at various  dates  in the future.  In this  way,  we  can quantify 
the risk of backsliding. 
Let  T+1'T+H  represent  a potential  future  sequence  of recursive  t-statistics 
for  f31(1) -  1, 
T+1,T+H =  [+  r  +]  ~  L7T+1,  * *  *,  TT+HJ - 
We want  to make  statements  about  how  these  sequences  are likely  to 
evolve.  From a Bayesian  perspective,  the  natural way  to proceed  is to 
compute  the posterior predictive  density  for these  sequences, 
p(,+1T+H  IYT).  (5.1) 
To sample  from this density,  we  start with  the posterior  predictive  den- 
sity  for inflation  and  unemployment  and  then  exploit  the  fact that  t- 
statistics  are deterministic  functions  of the  data.30 Hence  we  can write 
p(W+l,T+H  I yT)  =  p(g(YTT+,T+H,  YT)YT),  (5.2) 
where  the function  g(-) is nothing  more than the output  of the recursive 
least-squares  algorithm  initialized  with  estimates  through  date  T.  To 
draw a realization  from (5.2),  we  first draw a trajectory for future infla- 
tion and unemployment  from their posterior predictive  density  and then 
apply the Kalman filter to compute  the associated  sequence  of test statis- 
tics. The probability that the test will reject at some  future date h is 
r  p(Th|r )Tdt,  (5.3) 
where  c(a) is the normal critical value  corresponding  to a one-sided  test 
of size  a.  In terms of our sampling  strategy, this is the fraction of simu- 
29. In our opinion,  strong rejections will be needed  to reverse the consensus  in favor of the 
natural-rate hypothesis. 
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lated  trajectories  in  which  ,3(1)  is  significantly  less  than  1 at  date  h, 
where  significance  is determined  by the  usual  classical criterion.  Thus, 
we  are offering  a Bayesian interpretation  of judgments  based  on a classi- 
cal procedure. 
Figure 17 reports results for a constant-gain  estimator. The results for a 
recursive  OLS estimator  are similar. We focus on the constant-gain  esti- 
mator because  this holds  the effective  sample  size constant as data accu- 
mulate.  Thus the increased  probability of rejection does  not follow  sim- 
ply from an increase in the number  of observations. 
As the figure shows,  the probability of rejection remains  small in the 
first two years of the forecast. But then it increases  quickly, reaches  50% 
within  9 years, and approaches  85% in 20 years. The increasing probabil- 
ity of rejection reflects the changing  nature of inflation-unemployment 
dynamics  along  with  the  fact that data from new  and  old  regimes  are 
being  mixed  in  different  proportions.  As  time  moves  forward,  data 
from  the  old  high-inflation,  strong-persistence  regime  are discounted 
more  heavily,  and  data  from  the  new  low-inflation,  weak-persistence 
Figure  17 PROBABILITY  OF REJECTING  THE  NATURAL-RATE 
HYPOTHESIS,  CALCULATED  FROM  THE  POSTERIOR 
PREDICTIVE  DISTRIBUTION  FOR  THE  CONSTANT-GAIN 
ESTIMATOR 
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regime  increasingly  dominate  the  sample.  The identifying  information 
from the  1970s is lost  little by little,  and  the properties  of the  Volcker- 
Greenspan  era come more and more into play. This confirms an element 
of Taylor's warning,  that the Solow-Tobin  test may once  again begin  to 
suggest  the existence  of a trade-off. 
6.  Concluding  Remarks 
This paper has used  a vector autoregression  with random coefficients  to 
measure  parameter  drift in U.S.  inflation-unemployment-interest-rate 
dynamics.  We construct  our model  to focus  on parameter  drift because 
we  are sympathetic  to  the  theoretical  views  expressed  in  Lucas  (1976) 
and Sargent (1999), which leads us to suspect  that evolution  in the mone- 
tary policy authority's view  of the world will make the systematic  part of 
a vector  autoregression  drift. We have  taken  seriously  our model's  de- 
scription of four sources of uncertainty about the future,31 and have used 
computer-intensive  Bayesian  methods  to  take  those  uncertainties  into 
account.  We use  the model  to develop  a number  of stylized  facts about 
the  evolution  of  postwar  U.S.  inflation  and  relate  them  to  important 
issues  about learning  to detect  the natural-rate hypothesis  using  imper- 
fect tests,  and how  the evolving  results from those  tests were  associated 
with  evolution  in a description  of a monetary  policy  rule (a Taylor rule). 
Among  other things,  we  find that the mean  and persistence  of inflation 
are strongly positively  correlated; that the persistence  of inflation is posi- 
tively  associated  with  statistics  that have been  used  to test for accepting 
the natural-rate hypothesis;  that evolving  measures  of policy  activism in 
fighting  inflation  broadly  point  to more  activism  with  a lag somewhat 
after test statistics began  accepting  the natural-rate hypothesis;  and that 
recently  the  degree  of persistence  in inflation  has  been  drifting  down- 
ward as inflation has come under control. 
We also study John Taylor's warning about recidivism toward an exploit- 
able trade-off between  inflation  and unemployment.  Unfortunately,  our 
statistical model  confirms Taylor's concerns.  Our model  predicts  that as 
observations  of lower, more stable inflation accumulate,  econometric  evi- 
dence  against  the natural-rate hypothesis  is likely to develop.32 Against 
31. These  are: (1) the unknown  current location  of the VAR coefficients,  (2) the unknown 
covariance  matrix  of  innovations  to  VAR coefficients  and  equations,  (3) the  future 
evolution  of  the  VAR coefficients,  and  (4) the  stream  of  future  shocks  to  the  VAR 
equations. 
32. Prospects  for  a  gradual  backsliding  away  from  the  zero-inflation  Ramsey  outcome 
toward the higher Nash inflation rate also permeate the "mean dynamics"  in the model 
of Sargent (1999) and Cho,  Williams,  and Sargent (2001). Evolving  Post-World  War  II U.S. Inflation  Dynamics  *  369 
this  evidence,  we  hope  that policymakers  do not  succumb  again to the 
temptation  to exploit  the Phillips  curve. 
Appendix.  A Nonlinear  Transition  Equation 
Our numerical  procedures  construct a sample  using  p(0T V) defined  by 
(2.13).  This appendix  verifies  that these  procedures  are consistent  with 
the  nonlinear  transition  function  defined  in the  text.  In particular, we 
verify  the  nonlinear  transition  equation,  p(0t+l Ot,  V)  oc  I(Ot+l) f(Ot+lOt,  V) 
from equations  (2.3),  (2.13),  (2.14),  and  (2.15). First consider  the transi- 
tion equation  for terminal state, 
p(OTy,  O-lV)  p(Olt-1,  V)=  .  (A.1) 
p(OT-1(V) 
The joint density  in the numerator  can be expressed  as 
p(OT'  T-lV)  -  p(oTIV)  dO-2 
(A.2) 
T-2 
OCI(OT)f(OTOT-  V)  17  I(0t+l)f(0t+lt,  V)dT  -2. 
t=0 
The marginal  density  in the  denominator  of (A.1)  can be  expressed  as 
P(0T-1IV)  =  f P(0T,  OT-V)  dOT 
(A.3) 
f 
I(OT)f(OT  OT-1,  V)  dOT  H  I(ot+l)f(0o+1t,  V)dT-2. 
t=O 
The ratio between  the two is 
P(OTIT_-1,  V)  c  I(0T)f(OTlOT-1,  V).  (A.4) 
Next consider  the transition equation  for the penultimate  state, 
P(OT-1  O  2,-  P  V) 
- 
)  (A.5) 
P(OT-  2V) 
The joint density  in the numerator  of (A.5) can be expressed  as 370 *  COGLEY  & SARGENT 
P(OT-10T-2  V)  =  P(0T  IV)p(0TI0T-i/  V) dOT-3  d0 
=  p(OT-11V)d0T-3  Jp(OTI6T-1 V) dO 
=  f  p(OT-lV)  dT-3,  (A.6) 
where  the last equality  follows  from the fact that p(OTI  T-1,  V) integrates 
to one.  Using  the same argument  as above,  this can be expressed  as 
P(OT-1/OT-21V)  cI(OT-1)f(OT-  OT-2/  V)  f  H  I(Ot+)f  (Ot+1  OtV)dOT-3. 
t=0 
The  marginal  density  for  0T-2 is 
P(OT-2_v)  =  P(OT-1/  OT-21V)dOT-1 
T-3 
f  I(OrT-)f(0T-1O0T-2,V)dOTr-1  f I(Ot+1)f(0t+lOt, V) dO-3. (A.7) 
t=O 
The ratio between  the two is 
P(OT-1_OT-2, V)  XI(OT-)f(OT-lOT-2  V).  (A.8) 
Continuing  a backward recursion implies 
p(otlot-I, V)  I(Ot)f(OOtlet-,  V).  (A.9) 
Hence,  the  nonlinear  transition  equation  can  indeed  be  expressed  in 
terms of the truncated linear transition equation. 
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Comment 
CHRISTOPHER  A. SIMS 
Princeton  University 
1. Introduction 
My comments  fall under  three main headings: 
(i)  The later, Taylor-rule part of the paper is a structural VAR analysis. 
It uses  nonstandard,  and  questionable,  identifying  assumptions 
without  giving  us  a discussion  of why  it differs  from most  of the 
literature  or what  motivates  the  nonstandard  specification.  It also 
fails  to check  its  specification  as thoroughly  as is standard  in  the 
structural VAR literature. 
(ii)  The evidence  that monetary  policy  behavior  has  changed  sharply 
between  early and late postwar  periods,  or even  between  interwar 
and  postwar  periods,  is  less  strong  than  might  appear  from  this 
paper. 
(iii)  The paper sets a new,  and high,  standard for descriptive  analysis of 
macroeconomic  data. I hope  it will be widely  copied,  and therefore 
want to be sure to register objections to certain aspects of its techni- 
cal procedures  before it's too late. Some of the questionable  aspects 
of its procedures  may have  affected  its conclusions. 
2.  Identification 
There are several related facts about policy  rules and their relation to the 
data that reflect the  identification  problem  that must  be  confronted  in 
evaluating  claims to estimate  a rule. 
It is easy to generate "policy  shocks"  that produce  strong price puzzles, particu- 
larly in  pre-1979 data, as  we see from Barth and Ramey's paper in  this 
volume. Identification  schemes that produce  price puzzles tend also to imply 
large real effects  of monetary  policy shocks  and small responses  of interest  rates 
to lagged inflation-low  activism. 
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No matter what the actual policy rule, it will be possible to estimate  a regression 
of interest rate on 'fundamentals" (i.e. not P, M, or other nominal variables: 
intrinsic state variables) that can play the role of a statistical "interest-rate 
equation."  Yet, in most equilibrium  models, if this regression  were in fact the 
policy rule and  fiscal policy took  the conventionally  assumed  form, the model's 
equilibrium  would be indeterminate. 
Observations  from a gold-standard or price-level-targeting  policy regime will 
spuriously imply a nonactivist  policy rule unless quite sophisticated  simulta- 
neity is recognized in the estimation. This follows because in such regimes 
high inflation  predicts  low future inflation, which through  the Fisher  equation 
then implies low current nominal interest rates. Such a regime can be gener- 
ated by a policy reaction  function that makes r respond very strongly to the 
price level or inflation, but the policy reaction  function is not recovered  by 
OLS regression. 
In other words,  there is always an identification  problem  in determining 
whether  policy  is active.  The identification  problem  can be solved,  but 
only by bringing  in identifying  assumptions  that are not testable. 
One of the identifying  assumptions  in this paper is that the residual in 
a VAR ex post  real-interest-rate  equation  with  unemployment  and  CPI 
on  the  right  is  the  policy  shock,  which  amounts  to  a  recursive  VAR 
identification  scheme.  While much of the identified  VAR literature relies 
on this assumption,  it can lead to problematic interpretations  of the data. 
Most prominently, price puzzles  (inflationary response  to monetary tight- 
ening)  are a common  outcome  (as e.g.  in Barth and  Ramey's  paper  in 
this volume)  when  purely recursive identification  schemes  are applied to 
pre-1980  U.S.  data.  As  Leeper  and  Zha  (2001) show,  policy  rules  are 
estimated  as stable and without  price puzzles  when  the fact that policy 
behavior  (at least before  1980) involved  responses  to the money  stock is 
allowed  for and the resulting  simultaneity  is recognized. 
The paper also presents  its policy reaction function  as a "real-interest- 
rate rule." The unusual  timing  of the  paper's  data (r is not  a quarterly 
average,  but rather a monthly  average  from the first month  in the quar- 
ter,  while  the  other  data  are quarterly  averages)  makes  this  assertion 
difficult  to  interpret.  In  a  continuous-time,  or  cleanly  discrete-time, 
model,  when  prices  are flexible  and  money  is  neutral,  the  monetary 
authority  simply  cannot set the real interest rate. A policy  equation with 
the  real  rate  on  the  left,  even  if  it has  lagged  inflation  on  the  right, 
contradicts the mapping  from the economy's  real state to its real interest 
rate. With non-neutralities  in the model,  nonexistence  will no longer be 
a logical necessity,  but there will be a range of models,  with  weak  non- 
neutralities,  for  which  such  policy  rules  raise  existence  problems.  It Comment 375 
seems  unwise  to impose  a policy  rule of this  form on  the  data as an a 
priori restriction. 
To understand  this problem,  consider  the simple  model 
rt =  Et-l7Tt +  rt  (Fisher  relation), 
rt =  Et-lt  +  aOrt-1  +  yUt-1  +  Et  (policy  rule). 
It is easy to understand  that this pair of equations  leads to nonexistence 
of a stable  rational-expectations  equilibrium,  because  taking  the  differ- 
ence  of the two  equations  would  force innovations  in the real rate to be 
exact  functions  of  innovations  in  the  policy  equation.  If we  replaced 
Et_lvt  in  the  first  equation  with  Et.rt+1, as  would  be  appropriate  if  the 
model's  data  had  conventional  timing,  the  system  would  be  well  be- 
haved.  But of course,  if the data had conventional  timing,  this specifica- 
tion  would  no  longer  represent  policy  setting  the  real rate.  Replacing 
Etl-rt in the  second  equation  with  rt itself  is no  help,  however,  as the 
resulting  system  still has no solution.  It would  have  been  better for the 
paper to stick with  a nominal-rate  rule, as does  the rest of the structural 
VAR literature.  As  it is,  the  interpretation  of all the  parts of the  paper 
that depend  on this identification  is problematic. 
I agree with the authors that it is reasonable  to assert as an identifying 
assumption  that policy  responds  only  to lagged  information.  This view 
could  have  been  incorporated  into  their  structure  simply  by  omitting 
current  rTt  from the reaction function. 
Papers in the structural VAR literature almost universally check identifi- 
cation by examining impulse responses,  trying to ensure that the estimated 
system  does  not have  unreasonable  properties.  It is easy  for apparently 
reasonable  identifying  restrictions to lead to estimated  systems  that are 
implausible,  so this type of check is important.  This paper does  no such 
checking.  Thus we do not know whether the periods of implied low activ- 
ism also are accompanied by a price puzzle,  whether the implied responses 
of monetary  authorities to private shocks  are reasonable,  or whether  the 
responses  of the economy  to the policy shocks are reasonable. 
Probably  the  majority view  among  macroeconomists  (and especially 
within  the  Fed  system?)  is  that  monetary  policy  has  changed  drasti- 
cally for the better over the last 30 or 40 years-Alan  Greenspan  is com- 
pletely different from Arthur Burns. But the most careful statistical assess- 
ments  of this idea are at best inconclusive,  and for the most part suggest 
on the contrary that changes  in the systematic  component  of policy in this 
period are modest.  Examples of work that comes to this conclusion,  using 
widely  different methodologies,  are papers by Orphanides  (2001), Leeper 
and  Zha  (2001),  Hanson  (2001),  and  me  (Sims,  1999).  My  own  paper 376 *  SIMS 
argues  that  the  most  important  changes  between  periods  can  be  ac- 
counted  for as shifts in the variances of the structural disturbances.  Time- 
varying  variances  are hard to distinguish  from parameter variation.  At- 
tempts to show  shifts in policy behavior should  recognize  this, in order to 
come into contact with  the literature supporting  the opposite  view. 
3.  Time-Varying  Descriptive  Statistics 
The paper implements  a novel  strategy to summarize  the variation in the 
economy's  characteristics  over  time.  It uses  descriptive  statistics  com- 
puted from simulated  future time paths drawn from the posterior predic- 
tive  density  at each  date,  displaying  how  they  change  over  time.  The 
results are thought-provoking  and deserve  further study. I found particu- 
larly interesting  the concentration  of the posterior on the activism coeffi- 
cient  during  the  1970s,  followed  by  widening  uncertainty  thereafter. 
Even though  the paper's  interpretation  of its activism  coefficient may be 
dubious,  this pattern  of increased,  then  decreased,  certainty  about  im- 
portant components  of inflation dynamics  is suggestive.  Phenomena  like 
this might have played  a role in the inertia of policy at the time and in the 
subsequent  popularity  of Monday-morning  quarterbacking about it. 
The  paper  sticks  entirely  to  forward-looking  data  summaries.  For 
many  purposes  this  is  appropriate,  but  such  filtered,  as  opposed  to 
smoothed, estimates  of the  stochastic  properties  of the  model  contain  a 
component  of variation that is learning,  rather than actual time variation 
in the behavior  of the economy.  Commonly  graphs like, say, Figure 11 or 
12  show  quite  different  time  paths  when  computed  on  the  basis  of 
smoothed  estimates.  The difference  lets  us distinguish  between  best  ex 
post  estimates  of  what  was  actually  happening  and  best  current  esti- 
mates at the time of what was happening.  It would  be interesting  to see 
the work extended  in that direction. 
4.  The "Learning  the NRH" Story 
The paper's  Figure 14 confirms a point  that Albert Ando  has made  for a 
long  time: It is hard to blame  the inflation  of the  1970s on econometric 
modelers  serving  up  a long-run  inflation  trade-off.  It is  an  important 
result  of  both  Chung's  thesis-which  this  paper  cites-and  Sargent's 
book  that  the  story  that  naive  econometric  Phillips-curve  estimation 
led to the inflation  of the 1970s cannot be sustained. 
This paper  proposes  a new,  incompletely  articulated  theory. It seems 
to me  more  a narrative  theory  than  a time-invariant  one  that could  be 
tested.  The theory used  in Chung's  thesis,  in Sargent's book,  and in my Comment 377 
(1988) paper  specifies  both  the  (incorrect) model  the  policymakers  use 
and  the  correct (natural-rate) model  relating  unemployment  and  infla- 
tion. It works out the consequences  of these  assumptions.  My paper and 
Chung's  thesis  show  that such  a setup  can easily  lead  to very  long  (at 
least  millennia),  possibly  permanent  periods  of near-Ramsey  behavior, 
with  interest  rates  and  inflation  low  on  average.  Sargent's  book  and 
Chung's  thesis  show  that this setup  does  poorly at explaining  U.S. post- 
war  inflation  and  unemployment  data,  because  it implies  that  policy 
authorities  quickly realized the Phillips curve is nearly vertical. 
It is hard to understand  why  the paper gives  such a prominent  role to 
the  t-test  for  the  hypothesis  ,31(1)  =  1.  Figure  14 shows  that  the  test 
strongly  rejected the null  starting in 1973. Not  until  more  than 6 years 
later, in late 1979, did the  "Volcker regime" begin.  If the  t-test showing 
neutrality  was  crucial to producing  the Volcker policies,  the connection 
was certainly not a simple one.  It seems  likely that the connection  of this 
t-test to future changes  in policy will be at least as tenuous. 
My own view,  which  agrees in many respects  with that of Orphanides 
(2001),  is  that  unemployment  rose  and  inflation  rose  because  of  real 
disturbances  that lowered  growth.  Faced with  the  simultaneous  rise in 
these  two variables,  and believing  that unemployment  affected inflation 
with  a lag,  policymakers  had  to decide  whether  the  rise in unemploy- 
ment that had already occurred was enough  to exert adequate  deflation- 
ary pressure.  Since such  "stagflation" had not occurred before on such a 
scale,  they  faced a difficult inference  problem,  which  it took them some 
years to unravel.  Note  that in this story it is not P1(1) that is crucial, but 
the relation between  30  and  32(1),  i.e.  the Phillips-curve  "natural rate." I 
think it likely that careful statistical work using  the Phillips curve would 
have  demonstrated  much  earlier  than  1979 that  the  current  levels  of 
unemployment  were  not  exerting  much  downward  pressure  on  infla- 
tion.  But policy  models  at the  time were  estimating  "gap" variables by 
focusing  entirely  on  real factors-production  functions  and trend rates 
of  growth.  Policymakers  realized  their mistake  only  slowly  because  of 
excessive  reliance on a theory  that claimed  the  "gap" was  a function  of 
the level  of output  and the current level  of technology.  If they had paid 
more  attention  to  a wider  range  of  data,  they  would  have  seen  their 
mistake earlier. 
The notion  that monetary  policy  acts on the price level by first affect- 
ing  unemployment,  or a "gap," which  then  via a Phillips  curve  affects 
inflation,  is in my view  mistaken.  But if it had been the basis of a flexibly 
parameterized  dynamic  econometric  model  analyzing  inflation,  interest 
rates, and real growth jointly, it probably would  not have led to such an 
acceleration of inflation as actually occurred. 378 *  SIMS 
5.  Priors 
The paper  uses  a prior that makes  no  attempt  to push  the  parameter 
estimates  toward  the  unit-root  boundary,  centers  the  prior at an  OLS 
estimate  (which  will tend  to be more stationary  than the truth when  the 
truth is near the unit-root boundary),  and truncates the parameter space 
to rule out even  mildly unstable  roots.  This is in the name of being  "less 
informative" than, e.g.,  Doan,  Litterman, and Sims. It is always true that 
there is no unique  way  to produce  an "uninformative"  prior, and this is 
especially  true in VARs. A prior like that proposed  here,  in a model  that 
conditions  on initial  observations,  implies  a lot of weight  on stationary 
models,  which  in turn generally imply that a great deal of sample history 
is explained  by large initial transients.  How  this happens  is elaborated in 
some  earlier work  of mine  (Sims,  2000). Such a prior is not uninforma- 
tive,  and may easily  lead to strange results. 
In the latter part of the paper simulations  are used  to give us an idea of 
how  long  it is likely  to be before  t-tests  of  38(1) =  1 are likely  again to 
accept the null hypothesis.  But the prior's concentration  on stable mod- 
els,  and  the  time-variation  model's  insistence  on  making  the  model 
bounce  away  from the nonstationary  boundary,  could be strongly  influ- 
encing  the results  of these  simulations. 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper breaks new  ground in interpreting  data with a structural VAR 
and time-varying  parameters.  Many of the methodological  ideas in it are 
new  and  worth  pursuing.  Its choices  of prior and  identifying  assump- 
tions,  however,  are deviations  from standard  practice in the  structural 
VAR literature that should  not,  in my view, be imitated.  These aspects  of 
the modeling  and  interpretation  are crucial enough  to the paper's  sub- 
stantive  conclusions  that those  conclusions  remain doubtful. 
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1. Introduction 
Cogley  and Sargent have provided  a provocative  and innovative  contri- 
bution  on an important  problem,  understanding  the history  of inflation 
in  the  United  States  and  the  evolving  role  of  monetary  policy  in  that 
history. They make many points  in their rich paper,  some  empirical and 
some  methodological. 
In  this  discussion,  I  focus  on  four  of  their  most  salient  empirical 
findings: 
1.  The persistence  of the postwar  inflation process has evolved  over the 
past four decades.  In the 1960s, inflation  was  mean-reverting;  in the 
1970s and early 1980s, it was highly  persistent;  and in the past ten to 
fifteen  years  it has been  mean-reverting,  as it was  in the  1960s. This 
view  is widely  shared-for  example,  it has also been  made by Taylor 
(1999) and by Brainard and Perry (2000)-and  it seems  to reflect con- 
ventional  wisdom  across a wide spectrum of views  of monetary policy. 
2.  There is a positive  correlation between  the level  of inflation,  as mea- 
sured  by  its  low-frequency  component,  and  its persistence.  This is 
essentially  an implication  of the first point,  because  inflation was low 
in the 1960s, high  in the 1970s and early 1980s, and low again during 
the 1990s. 
3.  The inflation  process  has been  unstable,  not just as measured  by its 
persistence,  but also  over  its entire spectrum  or, equivalently,  all its 
autocorrelations. 
4.  The reduced-form  backward-looking  Phillips  curve relating inflation 
to lagged  inflation and a measure  of real economic  activity (in Cogley 
and Sargent, the unemployment  rate) has been unstable over the past 
four decades. 
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Cogley  and Sargent draw several  conclusions  from these  and related 
empirical  findings.  The  most  immediately  relevant  for policy  bears  on 
Taylor's (1999) warning  that  the  decline  in  the  persistence  of inflation 
might  induce  revisionism  by  policymakers,  who  might  return  to  the 
belief that there is an exploitable  long-run  trade-off between  unemploy- 
ment  and  inflation.  The meat  of Taylor's warning  is that this revision- 
ism-perhaps  a better term is recidivism-would  lead to the same  mis- 
takes and the same bad outcomes  that it did in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
In this,  Cogley  and Sargent's  message  is the same  as in Sargent's  (1999) 
monograph  on  the  history  of  U.S.  inflation  as  elaborated  on  by  Cho, 
Williams,  and Sargent (2001). 
Most  of  this  discussion  is  devoted  to  presenting  various  pieces  of 
empirical  evidence  that suggest  that the  foregoing  four empirical  find- 
ings  are less  clear-cut  than  Cogley  and  Sargent  make  them  out  to be. 
Specifically,  I shall present  evidence,  based  on  hypothesis  tests,  confi- 
dence  intervals,  and median-unbiased  estimates,  that: 
1.  Inflation  persistence  has  been  roughly  constant,  and high,  over  the 
past 40 years in the United  States. 
2.  Therefore,  there  is no  correlation between  the  level  of inflation  and 
its persistence. 
3.  The autocorrelations  of inflation  are stable-at  least,  one  cannot  re- 
ject this hypothesis. 
4.  The reduced-form  Phillips curve is stable, once one allows  for a time- 
varying  NAIRU,  or if one  interprets it not just as a relation between 
the unemployment  rate and the rate of inflation, but more broadly as 
a relation between  real economic  activity and inflation. 
These  conclusions  are quite  at odds  with  Cogley  and  Sargent's,  and 
this raises an interesting  econometric  question  as to why  my evidence  is 
so different  than theirs.  The answer,  not surprisingly,  lies in differences 
between  Cogley  and  Sargent's  Bayesian  methods  and  my  frequentist 
methods. 
2.  Evaluating  Cogley  and  Sargent's  Empirical  Results 
Cogley  and Sargent use a sophisticated  nonlinear multivariate procedure 
to characterize  inflation  dynamics.  The methods  used  here  are simpler 
and univariate,  but get at the same  issues.  The inflation  data I consider 
are for the GDP deflator,  quarterly from 1959:I to 2000:IV, although  the 
results are robust to using  other inflation  measures. Comment  *  381 
2.1 PERSISTENCE  OF INFLATION 
There are a variety  of ways  to measure  persistence,  none  perfect.  The 
measure  I consider  is the largest root of an autoregressive  representation 
of  inflation.  Cogley  and  Sargent's  emphasis  is  on  measurement,  not 
testing,  so  to  make  this  analysis  parallel  I consider  median-unbiased 
estimates  of the  largest  autoregressive  root of inflation,  constructed  by 
inverting  the augmented  Dickey-Fuller  statistic using  the procedure  de- 
veloped  in Stock  (1991). This procedure  produces  confidence  intervals 
for the largest root as well. 
Recursive  median-unbiased  estimates  of the largest AR root and 90% 
confidence  intervals  for this root are plotted  in Figure 1 [these estimates 
are based  on AR(4) models  estimated  recursively  using  all the data from 
1959:I through  the  date  indicated  on  the  horizontal  axis].  The striking 
feature of this plot is the stability of the estimates.  Because the number of 
observations  increases  with  the  terminal  date,  the  confidence  intervals 
are tighter towards  the end  of the sample  than at the beginning.  At all 
dates since 1976, these intervals include  one (the 90% confidence  interval 
is briefly above  one in 1975), and the recursive median-unbiased  estimate 
is typically just less than one. 
The recursive  estimates  in Figure 1 use  all the historical  data through 
the  terminal  date,  and  this might  miss  changes  in persistence  towards 
the end  of the sample.  Figure 2 therefore plots  rolling median-unbiased 
estimates  of the largest AR root and the associated  90% confidence  inter- 
val for AR(4) models  estimated  using  12 years of data terminating  at the 
date  on  the  horizontal  axis.  The median-unbiased  point  estimates  and 
confidence  intervals evidently  are quite noisy-not  surprisingly, because 
each estimate  is based  on just 48 observations,  quite few for performing 
inference  about large autoregressive  roots.  Still, the evidence  is striking 
(and is robust to changing  the inflation  series,  the window  length,  and 
the  number  of lags).  With  one  brief exception  for the  samples  ending 
near  1994,  the  90% confidence  intervals  contain  a unit  root,  and  the 
median-unbiased  estimate,  while  variable,  exceeds  one  almost  as often 
as it is less than one. Notably, the median-unbiased  estimate exceeds  one 
early in the sample,  for 12-year periods ending  in 1972 through  1976, and 
late in the sample,  for 12-year periods  ending  in 1997 through  2000. 
2.2  RELATION BETWEEN PERSISTENCE  AND  THE LEVEL 
OF INFLATION 
The results  in Figure 2 suggest  that there will be no  particular relation 
between  the  level  of  inflation  and  its  persistence  as  measured  by  the 
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essentially  one throughout  this sample. This is in fact the case; the correla- 
tion between  the running mean of inflation and the rolling estimate of the 
largest AR root in Figure 2 over the same  12 years is -0.035. 
2.3 INSTABILITY  OF INFLATION  AT  HIGHER  FREQUENCIES 
Cogley  and  Sargent  examine  instability  of  inflation  dynamics,  both 
short- and long-run,  via spectral estimates  implied  by their time-varying 
VAR. Here,  I consider  a more  tightly  parametrized  approach  and  ask 
whether  there  appears  to  have  been  a break  in  the  parameters  of  a 
univariate  AR(5) model  of  the  inflation  rate.  This  is  readily  examined 
using  the  Quandt  likelihood-ratio  (or  "sup-Wald")  test  for parameter 
stability. Although  this test is designed  around a single break, it is power- 
ful  against  slow  parameter  evolution  and  multiple  breaks  as  well.  A 
technical  issue  is that the  critical values  need  to hold  when  the  largest 
root is one or nearly so; I handle this by using the critical values appropri- 
ate if the largest root is in fact one,  taken from Banerjee, Lumsdaine,  and 
Stock (1992), rather than the critical values  appropriate when  the largest 
root is well  less than one.  The test,  implemented  with conventional  15% 
trimming,  fails to reject the hypothesis  of parameter stability at the 10% 
significance  level.  However,  using  CPI inflation and different lag specifi- 
cations can yield a significant break at the 10%, but not 5%, level, with the 
estimated  break date in 1981. This evidence  suggests  that, on the whole, 
the  inflation  process  has  been  stable,  although  there might  have  been 
some changes  in its short-run dynamics  between  the first and the second 
half of the sample. 
2.4 INSTABILITY  OF THE  PHILLIPS  CURVE 
Whether the backward-looking  Phillips curve, interpreted  as the relation 
between  inflation,  its lags, and current and past values  of the unemploy- 
ment  rate, is unstable  has attracted much  attention.  The evidence  I pro- 
vide here is borrowed  from Staiger, Stock, and Watson (2001), who inves- 
tigate  the stability  of the backward-looking  Phillips  relation of the type 
investigated  by Gordon  (1997, 1998). 
A subdebate in this area has been whether  the natural rate of unemploy- 
ment should  be estimated  as the low-frequency  component  of the unem- 
ployment  rate [the approach  advocated  by  Hall (1999) and  adopted  by 
Cogley  and Sargent] or whether  it should  be estimated  off an estimated 
drift in the intercept of an empirical Phillips curve [the approach adopted 
by King, Stock, and Watson  (1995), Gordon  (1997, 1998), Staiger, Stock, 
and Watson (1997), and others]. 
Staiger,  Stock,  and  Watson  (2001)  adopt  Hall's  and  Cogley  and 
Sargent's  approach  and  estimate  the  natural  rate by  applying  a low- Comment  *  385 
pass  filter to  the  unemployment  rate.  Because  the  natural  rate is  esti- 
mated  using  only  the  univariate  unemployment  rate,  it is  possible  to 
test separately  for drift in intercept  of the Phillips  curve and for drift in 
the  slope  coefficient;  the  NAIRU  is  the  sum  of  the  estimated  natural 
rate  and  the  rescaled  estimated  intercept  drift.  Thus  the  NAIRU  and 
the natural rate are separately  identified.  Their conclusion  is that in fact 
these  two  series  are  very  close  to  each  other  empirically,  typically 
within  a few  tenths  of  a percentage  point  of unemployment.  The hy- 
pothesis  that there  is no  intercept  drift in the  Phillips  curve,  specified 
as the deviation  of the unemployment  rate from its univariate  long-run 
trend,  cannot  be  rejected  at  the  10% significance  level.  In  practice, 
then,  there  appears  to  be  little  difference  between  estimates  of  the 
natural  rate based  on  the  Hall's  and  Cogley  and  Sargent's  idea  of  the 
long-run  trend in the unemployment  rate and the alternative  approach 
of estimating  the  time-varying  NAIRU  from intercept  drift in the  Phil- 
lips curve. 
Staiger, Stock, and Watson  (2001) also test for drift in the slope  of the 
Phillips curve and cannot reject the null that the slope  is stable. 
Another  way to see whether  the Phillips curve has been stable is to see 
how  it has  performed  for forecasting.  Interpreted  broadly,  the  Phillips 
relation  links  changes  in  the  rate  of  inflation  to  economic  activity,  of 
which  the unemployment  rate is but one measure.  In their comparisons 
of models  for forecasting  inflation,  Stock and Watson  (1999, 2001) con- 
sider  several  versions  of  the  backward-looking  Phillips  curve,  each 
based  on different activity measures.  They conclude  that several activity 
measures  have  produced  reliable and useful  inflation  forecasts,  at least 
as measured  by pseudo-out-of-sample  forecast comparisons  with bench- 
mark  autoregressive  models.  These  include  a composite  index  of  real 
economic  activity constructed  using  a large number  of income  and out- 
put  measures,  as  well  as  simpler  single  measures  such  as  the  rate of 
capacity  utilization.  Based  on  these  broader  measures  of  output,  the 
backward-looking  Phillips  curve has been  a reasonably  reliable and sta- 
ble predictive  relation over the past three decades. 
3.  Why Do the Bayesian  and Frequentist  Results Differ? 
These conclusions  are quite different than Cogley  and Sargent's,  and the 
obvious  question  is, why? There are many differences between  my meth- 
ods and theirs: theirs are Bayesian and multivariate,  mine are frequentist 
and  mainly  univariate.  I believe,  however,  that  there  are  two  main 
sources  of these  differences:  their prior leads  them  away  from finding 
persistence,  and  their specification,  by  forcing  all the  time variation  to 386 *  STOCK 
occur  through  the  dynamics  rather than  through  the  innovation  vari- 
ances,  confuses  changes  in persistence  with  changes  in volatility. 
These  views  are informed  by  the  recent  study  by  Pivetta  and  Reis 
(2001), who  compare  the  frequentist  analysis  of inflation  persistence  of 
the  previous  section,  Cogley  and  Sargent's  Bayesian  method,  and  a 
more  conventional  time-varying  parameter  model  of the  type  used  by 
Brainard and Perry (2000). Although  their analysis  remain preliminary at 
the time of writing this comment,  Pivetta and Reis' (2001) results suggest 
that Cogley  and Sargent's importance  sampling  plays  an important  role 
in biasing  (from a frequentist  perspective)  their estimates  away  from a 
unit  root.  This  forces  their  posterior  to  have  a low  mean  persistence, 
even  if the true persistence  (from a frequentist perspective)  is quite large. 
The  problem  that  Cogley  and  Sargent  confront  is  a difficult  one,  and 
even  among  Bayesian econometricians  there appears to be no consensus 
about the best way to place a prior on large autoregressive  roots (see the 
special  issue  of  Econometric  Theory in  1994 on  Bayesian  approaches  to 
unit-root  inference  and  in particular the  survey  article by Uhlig,  1994). 
The  problem  of  confounding  persistence  and  volatility  is  especially 
important, and Cogley and Sargent recognize  this issue.  Their persistence 
measures  are based  on  the  spectrum  at frequency  zero,  but  this  can 
change  either because  the persistence  has changed  or because  the entire 
spectrum  has  shifted,  that is,  the volatility  of the process  has  changed. 
One  does  not  need  fancy  tests  to see  that the volatility  of the  inflation 
process has changed  greatly over the postwar period: the 1960s and 1990s 
were times of quiescent  low inflation, the 1970s and early 1980s, of volatile 
high  inflation.  Because  the  integral  of the  spectrum  is the variance,  on 
using  the height  of the spectrum  as a measure  of persistence,  quiescence 
becomes  low persistence,  and volatility becomes  high persistence. 
4.  Implications  and Conclusions 
The evidence  in Figures  1 and 2 suggests  that inflation  has been  highly 
persistent  for the past three decades,  and stably so. My interpretation  of 
the  widespread  view-that  of  Brainard,  Perry,  Taylor,  Cogley,  and 
Sargent-is  that this  confuses  volatility  with  persistence.  Inflation  was 
low and stable in the 1960s and 1990s, but this does  not mean that it was 
low  and mean-reverting. 
Whether  or not the persistence  of inflation  has  evolved,  one  implica- 
tion  of  this  discussion  is that we  need  additional  investigations  of the 
statistical properties  of Cogley  and Sargent's method  before  adopting  it 
for widespread  use  as a tool for data description. Discussion *  387 
Finally, let me  turn to Taylor's warning,  for here  I agree with  Cogley 
and Sargent. The fact is that many monetary economists  believe  inflation 
to have become  less persistent,  and this view  must be reckoned with.  To 
the  extent  that  this  view  is held  (correctly or not)  by  policymakers  or 
advisors  and to the extent that it encourages  a revisionist  perspective  on 
the natural rate, then  it does  raise concerns  about inadvertently  repeat- 
ing the inflationary  mistakes  of the past. 
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Rick Mishkin  was  sympathetic  to the suggestion  that what  happened 
in the 1970s was that the Federal Reserve thought  that the natural rate of 
unemployment  was  lower  than  it actually  was.  He was  not  so worried 
that the  Solow-Tobin  test  would  cause  problems  in  the  future,  as ad- 
vances  since the 1970s in the understanding  of the natural-rate hypothe- 
sis  and  in  time-series  econometrics  are  unlikely  to  go  away.  He  also 
noted that there had been a substantial restructuring of monetary  institu- 
tions  since  the  1970s,  including  increased  central-bank  independence 
and an increased  emphasis  on price stability. He was most worried about 
recidivism  occurring because  of policymakers  underestimating  the natu- 
ral rate of unemployment,  noting  the wide  confidence  intervals  on Jim 
Stock's  estimates  of  the  natural  rate.  Mishkin  suggested  that inflation 
targeting was the way  to avoid  a repeat of the 1970s. 
Ken Rogoff noted  that the view  that Japan was stuck in a liquidity trap 
was a very powerful  one in the policy literature. As a result, many policy 
economists  indeed  believe  that output  growth  may be harmed if the rate 
of inflation wanders  too close to zero. He also remarked that in countries 
other than  the  United  States,  there  had  obviously  been  a lot of institu- 
tional change  since the 1970s, so it was hard to see how  monetary policy 
could have  remained  stable. 
Mark Gertler remarked  that he  and  Richard Clarida had  constructed 
measures  of  core  inflation  for  Germany  similar  in  spirit  to  those  of 
Cogley  and  Sargent,  using  long-horizon  forecasts  to get  core inflation. 
The striking difference between  the United States and Germany was that 
although  Germany  suffered  the  same  shocks  as the  United  States,  and 
policymakers  had  the  same  reasons  to be  confused,  core inflation  was 
flat and  stationary  in Germany.  This  finding  suggested  that there  was 
something  different  about  U.S.  monetary  policy  in  the  1970s.  Gertler 
raised  the  possibility  that  the  shift  to  nonborrowed  reserves  in  1979- 
1982 could  have  allowed  shocks  to have  a greater impact,  although  the 
policy  shift  could  also  have  been  cover  for an attempt  to raise interest 
rates. 
Chris  Sims  explained  that  the  mere  fact  that  he  believed  monetary 
policy was stable did not mean that he believed  it was optimal. On recidi- 
vism,  he  believed  that there  were  dangers  in the  inertia  of orthodoxy. 
Sargent agreed  with  Sims on the problems  of identification  in VARs. 
He said the problem  was  more profound  than just partitioning  contem- 
poraneous  correlations,  as agents  could  have  more information  in their 
histories  than was revealed by the histories  of variables in the VAR. This 
fact generates  time aggregation  problems. 